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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
LEE GOLDMANt
INTRODUCTION
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in
part that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . " This Clause "guarantees more than
fair process"--it imposes substantive restraints on government power.2
Although the Court's substantive due process doctrine often has been
criticized, 3 it is now well established 4 and provides protection for so-
called fundamental rights.5
According to traditional doctrine, if government action substantially
interferes with a fundamental right, the state must demonstrate that the
t Professor, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, J.D. 1979.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The counterpart Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment imposes an identical restraint on the federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 719 (1997)).
3. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED
& UNNAMED 3 (1997) ("This paradoxical, even oxymoronic phrase-'substantive due process'-has
been inflated into a patched and leaky tire on which precariously rides the load of some substantive
human rights not named in the Constitution."); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 (1990) (explaining substantive due process is a "momentous
sham"); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980)
("' [Sjubstantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness."').
4. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-20; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); see
also David Crump, How Do Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Catalogu-
ing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 795, 838 (1996) ("The Supreme
Court consistently has... recognize[d] unenumerated fundamental rights .. "); James E. Fleming,
Securing Deliberate Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1995) ("Griswold today is a case that any
nominee, to stand a chance of being confirmed, has to say is rightly decided.").
5. Although substantive due process and fundamental rights doctrine sometimes are used
interchangeably, they are not equivalents. Substantive due process, in addition to securing certain
fundamental rights, see infra note 13, protects against arbitrary government action, see Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 766 (Souter, J., concurring); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting), safeguards individuals from conduct by
government officers that "shocks the conscience," County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
846 (1998); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172 (1952)), and limits the size of civil punitive damages, State Farm Auto Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). Nevertheless, this article focuses on the fundamental rights
branch of substantive due process generally, and the right to privacy, specifically.
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action is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.
6
If no fundamental right is involved, the government need only establish a
rational basis for the challenged action.7 Thus, determining whether
there is a fundamental right involved becomes critical. Unfortunately,
given the political differences of the Justices and the lack of any clear
conceptualization in this area, determining whether a fundamental right
exists has proven to be a Herculean task.
The Supreme Court Justices have adopted two, often conflicting,
approaches to determine whether a case involves a fundamental right.
The more liberal Justices, seeking to protect minority interests, ask
whether a right is central to personal dignity and autonomy or is at the
heart of liberty.8 The more conservative Justices, fearing judicial activ-
ism at the expense of democratic preferences, insist that a right is not
fundamental unless it is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 9 The former test is
easily criticized as too indeterminate,' 0 the latter as protecting only those
rights that don't need protection." The difficulty in determining whether
a fundamental right exists is compounded by disingenuous application of
the Court's compelling government interest and rational basis review.
12
It is not surprising then that there is little clarity on questions ranging
from the constitutionality of bans on same-sex marriages or the sale of
sex toys to criminalization of adultery, incest, or the use of marijuana for
medical purposes.
This article proposes a conceptualization of a central branch of the
fundamental rights doctrine-the constitutional right to privacy, ' 3 which
6. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 721; Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
686 (1977) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973)). Despite what traditional doctrine
provides, this article argues that a sliding scale approach to fundamental rights issues best balances
competing government and individual interests and is consistent with actual Supreme Court practice.
See infra notes 177-234 and accompanying text.
7. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 766-67 & n.9 (Souter, J., concurring); Lyng v. Castillo, 477
U.S. 635, 638-39 (1986).
8. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion);
see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 ("Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.").
9. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
10. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 4, at 854-56.
11. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140-41 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text; Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition
and Fundamental Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 101, 115 (2002).
12. See infra notes 106-26 and accompanying text.
13. In addition to providing protection for privacy interests, the fundamental rights branch of
substantive due process, see supra note 5, incorporates key provisions of the Bill of Rights against
the states, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968); Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and
Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 833, 842 (2003), and includes protection for the rights to vote, see Harper v. Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); to travel interstate, see United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966); to access the courts, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956), and to be free of totalitarian legislation, see Poe, 367 U.S.
at 521-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert L. Calhoun, Democracy and Natural Law,
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remedies some of the deficiencies in the Court's jurisprudence. Specifi-
cally, this article argues for a Lockean view 14 of the Constitution as a
pact between individuals and the government to forego certain rights that
are necessary to further society's interests, but with a reservation of
rights in certain private areas where the government does not belong.
When the government regulates in an area where it does not belong, pre-
sumptively it needs the regulation to be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest. If regulation is in an area where the
government does belong and the regulation does not significantly affect
private interests, presumptively the regulation is valid as long as there is
a rational basis for the regulation. However, if a regulation in an area
where the government belongs significantly affects private interests, a
balancing test should be applied, giving deference to the legislature's
initial determination of the appropriate balance. By specifically indicat-
ing the areas where the government does and does not belong and identi-
fying the most important variables in the balance when balancing is ap-
propriate, this article hopes to bring a degree of clarity, or at least hon-
esty and consistency, to an area in which it too long has been lacking.
The proposed conceptualization appears to be consistent with the views
of the Framers and early political philosophers, 15 as well as most of the
Court's case law.' 6 By providing a conceptualization and admitting to
balancing in some cases, the recommended approach provides more hon-
est analysis, better guidance to lower courts, and desired flexibility in
evaluating regulations impacting important individual interests.
Part I of this article provides a brief review of existing fundamental
rights law and the problems associated with both defining fundamental
rights and applying the Court's standard of review. Part II defines the
proposed right of privacy, specifying and justifying the areas where the
government does and does not belong. It explains the factors to be con-
sidered in the proposed balancing or sliding scale test and responds to
anticipated criticisms of the balancing approach. Finally, Part III ad-
5 NAT. L. F. 31, 36 (1960)); Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Jeb Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 806 (1989),
rights that are deemed fundamental to the structure of our governmental system. The constitutional
right to privacy, as used in this article, refers to the unenumerated right to privacy protected by
substantive due process. The article does not address privacy interests protected by specific provi-
sions of the Constitution, for example, the Fourth Amendment's right to be free of unreasonable
search and seizures, see U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361-62 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring), or tort concepts of privacy. See generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing
Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1087, 1100 (2002); Samuel D. Warren, & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890).
14. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 353 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690); see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 323-29 (2004); A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS
218-20 (1992); Mark C. Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due
Process Analysis of PersonalAutonomy Rights, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 85, 110-12 (2000).
15. See BARNETT, supra note 14, at 68-76; Niles, supra note 14, at 108.
16. See infra Part I.
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dresses many of the "hot" substantive due process questions, such as the
validity of bans on gay marriage and the use of medical marijuana, to
illustrate application of the recommended approach.
I. EXISTING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS/PRIVACY LAW
A. Determining Whether a Fundamental Right Exists
Ironically, much of the modem fundamental rights/privacy doctrine
derives from dissents in a case dismissed for lack ofjusticiability. In Poe
v. Ullman,1 7 plaintiffs challenged a Connecticut statute forbidding the
giving of contraceptive advice and the use of contraceptives. 18 The
Court held that there was no justiciable controversy based on its finding
that Connecticut had chosen not to enforce the statute. 19 Both Justice
Douglas and Justice Harlan dissented.20 Foreshadowing the Court's de-
cision in Griswold v. Connecticut,2 1 the Justices found the statute uncon-
stitutional as an invasion of privacy, a liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.22 Their approaches, however, presaged what
would become a continuing controversy for the Court. Justice Douglas
found that privacy is a right "implicit in a free society,, 23 finding support
for the right in both the "totality of the Constitutional scheme" and the
common law right "to be let alone. 24 He specifically rejected the notion
that tradition was a suitable basis for defining protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment, stating
The due process clause . . . guarantees basic rights, not because they
have become petrified as of any one time, but because due process
follows the advancing standards of a free society as to what is
deemed reasonable and right. It is to be applied, according to this
view, to facts and circumstances as they arise, the cases falling on
one side of the line or the other as a majority of the nine justices ap-
praise conduct as either implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or
as lying without the confines of that vague concept.
25
Justice Harlan, finding the contraceptives ban an "invasion of pri-
vacy in the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual's per-
sonal life,"2 6 agreed that the Connecticut statute violated the fundamental
rights belonging "to the citizens of all free governments. 27  Justice
17. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
18. Poe, 367 U.S. at 498.
19. Id. at 508.
20. Id. at 509, 522.
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. Poe, 367 U.S. at 517 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
24. Id. & n.12.
25. Id. at 518 n.9 (quoting OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 80
(1951)).
26. Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Harlan, citing Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States,
28
also found that the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment "con-
ferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.,
29
However, Justice Harlan, unlike Justice Douglas, did not feel comfort-
able allowing judges to roam at large. 30 Rather, he thought the balance
between the liberty of the individual and the demands of an organized
society should have "regard to what history teaches are the traditions
from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.'
This disagreement concerning the proper role of tradition and the per-
spective from which it should be defined has been a continuing contro-
versy for the Court.32
The Court as a whole explicitly recognized a right to privacy and
invalidated Connecticut's contraceptives ban in Griswold.33 Two years
later in Loving v. Virginia,34 the Court held that a ban on interracial mar-
riages violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
finding the freedom to marry a "vital personal right[] essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."35 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,36 the
right to use contraceptives recognized in Griswold was extended to un-
married couples. 37 The Court stated: "If the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child., 38 The
Court next held a ban on abortions unconstitutional in Roe v. Wade,
39
stating that the "right of privacy.., founded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty . . . is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy., 40  The
right of privacy was further expanded in Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land.4' In that case, the Court ruled unconstitutional a zoning ordinance
that limited occupancy in dwelling units to families narrowly defined to
28. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. Poe, 367 U.S. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
30. Id. at 544 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).
31. Id. at 542. Justice Harlan went on to recognize that tradition "is a living thing," and
defined the relevant tradition broadly as privacy in the individual's marital relations. Id. at 539, 542,
552.
32. See infra notes 62-84 and accompanying text; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S.
110, 123 (1989).
33. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
34. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. Id. at 12. The Court first held that the Virginia statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 11-12.
36. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
37. Id at 454-55.
38. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Id. at 153.
41. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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exclude the plaintiff and her two grandsons. 42 The plurality opinion af-
firmed that the Court had "long recognized that freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment., 43  In
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,44 the Court, al-
though affirming Missouri's right to require clear and convincing evi-
dence of an incompetent's wishes to withdraw life-sustaining medical
treatment, assumed and strongly suggested that the Due Process Clause
protected the right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. 45
Most recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,4 6 the Court, overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick,47 held unconstitutional Texas' statute making homosexual
sodomy illegal.48 The Court indicated that "Liberty protects the person
from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private
places .... [It] presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.
4 9
Even as the right of privacy was expanding, several Justices, fearing
a return to the Lochner era, expressed concern about the potentially
unlimited reach of the Court's expansive language and ad hoc identifica-
tion of fundamental rights. 50 The Court's retrenchment began with Bow-
42. Id. at 506.
43. Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
44. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
45. Id. at 281.
46. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
47. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
48. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
49. Id. at 562.
50. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion). In
Moore, the plurality stated:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court. There are
risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties
without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history
of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such
judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of this Court. That history counsels caution and restraint.
Moore, 431 U.S. at 502 (footnote omitted). In addition, Justice White in his dissent stated:
That the Court has ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional rights should
not lead it to repeat the process at will. The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitu-
tional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the
Constitution .... [Given] that much of the underpinning for the broad, substantive appli-
cation of the Clause disappeared in the conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary
in the 1930's and 1940's, the Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further
substantive content into the Due Process Clause ....
Id. at 544 (White, J. dissenting). In Griswold, Justice Goldberg explained:
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases
in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the 'traditions and
[collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted
[there]... as to be ranked as fundamental.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). Similarly, Justice Black, dissenting in Griswold, noted:
The Due Process Clause ... was liberally used by this Court to strike down economic
legislation in the early decades of this century, threatening, many people thought, the
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ers v. Hardwick,51 a challenge to Georgia's sodomy statute. Justice
White, writing for the Court, warned:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cogni-
zable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. That this is
so was painfully demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive
and the Court in the 1930's, which resulted in the repudiation of
much of the substantive gloss that the Court had placed on the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There
should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach
of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental.
52
The Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, found the sodomy stat-
ute constitutional and rejected the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment
provided protection of private sexual conduct between consenting
adults. 53 Justice White limited the reach of the Due Process Clause by
defining the right to be protected narrowly, asking whether there is a
fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sod-
omy.54 By focusing on the specific conduct, rather than aspirational
goals, 55 Justice White was easily able to conclude that such a right was
not "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither liberty
nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed"' 56 or "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition," 57 the two alternative tests he identi-
fied for determining fundamental rights.58
Justice Scalia, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,59 sought to further re-
strict the Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence. In Michael H., a
putative natural father whose blood tests indicated a 98.07% probability
of paternity challenged a California statute creating a presumption that
tranquility and stability of the Nation. That formula, based on subjective considerations
of 'natural justice,' is no less dangerous when used to enforce this Court's views about
personal rights than those about economic rights.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64
(1905)).
51. 478 U.S. 186, overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
52. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
53. Id. at 196.
54. Id.
55. The four dissenting justices challenged the majority's definition of the right involved
stating, "This case is no more about 'a fundamental right to engage in sodomy' . .. than Stanley v.
Georgia ... was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies .. " Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 191 (majority opinion)). "Rather, this case is about 'the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be
let alone."' Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928)).
56. Id. at 191-92 (majority opinion) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937)).
57. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
58. Id. at 191-92.
59. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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the father of a child born to a married woman was the woman's hus-
band.60 Justice Scalia's plurality opinion began by quoting Justice
White's reasons for being "extremely reluctant to breathe . . . further
substantive content into the Due Process Clause.",61 To "limit and guide
interpretation of the Clause," Justice Scalia insisted that a liberty interest
be "rooted in history and tradition." 62  No alternative test was offered,
and unlike in Poe, the focus of the Court's review of tradition was his-
torical.63 Moreover, writing for himself and the Chief Justice, Justice
Scalia explicitly adopted Justice White's strategy of defining the relevant
tradition narrowly. 64 Justice Scalia opined that the appropriate inquiry is
[T]o the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting,
or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified. If, for
example, there were no societal tradition, either way, regarding the
rights of the natural father of a child adulterously conceived, we
would have to consult and (if possible) reason from, the traditions re-
garding natural fathers in general.65
In Washington v. Glucksberg,66 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
a majority, upheld the state of Washington's ban on assisted suicide and
placed his own limiting gloss on the test for fundamental rights.67 He
first reiterated the Court's reluctance to "expand the concept of substan-
tive due process . . ,68 Although acknowledging that many of the
rights and liberties previously recognized by the Court sounded in per-
sonal autonomy, 69 the Chief Justice refused to recognize any right to
make all important, intimate, and personal decisions. 70 To determine if a
fundamental right existed, the Chief Justice first required a "'careful de-
scription' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest."' 1 By finding the
"careful description" of the fundamental right asserted by reference to
60. Id. at 114-15.
61. Id. at 122 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 544 (White, J., dissenting)).
62. Id. at 122-23.
63. Id. at 124-25.
64. Id. at 127 n.6.
65. Id. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, vigorously dissented. He
challenged Justice Scalia's reliance on tradition, his strictly historical perspective, and his definition
of the relevant right at the most specific level of generalization. Id. at 136 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan, filed a separate dissent. Id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting).
66. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
67. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
68. Id. (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). To justify this
reluctance, the Chief Justice observed: "'[G]uideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this un-
charted area are scarce and open-ended.' By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right
or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and
legislative action." Id. (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
69. Id. ("In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms pro-
tected by the Bill of Rights, the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the
rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to marital
privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion." (citations omitted)).
70. Id. at 727-28.
71. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
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the statute being challenged,72 the Chief Justice effectively garnered a
majority for Scalia's previously unadopted "most specific level" of gen-
eralization rule, or something very close to it.73 The Chief Justice further
limited expansion of substantive due process rights by requiring the as-
serted right to be both "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed .... ,,7 Glucks-
berg's conjunctive test necessarily is more restrictive than Bowers' dis-
junctive test or Michael H's focus solely on tradition. Glucksberg's
conjunctive test necessarily is more restrictive than Bowers' disjunctive
test or Michael H.'s focus solely on tradition. As in Michael H, Glucks-
berg's inquiry into relevant traditions was historical.75
Although not overruling prior cases establishing fundamental rights,
the conservative majority, through Bowers, Michael H., and Glucksberg,
appeared to completely transmogrify fundamental rights/privacy doc-
trine. In effect, the Court was saying, "this much but not more." It was
against this background that the Court decided Lawrence v. Texas.76
Lawrence not only overruled the Court's earlier decision in Bowers,
but contained broad open-ended language reminiscent of the Court's
earlier fundamental rights/privacy case law. Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, began his opinion by stating, "Liberty protects the person
from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private
places .... [It] presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression and certain intimate conduct., 77 He then spe-
cifically rejected Justice White's narrow framing of the relevant issue in
Bowers. 78 According to Justice Kennedy, "[t]o say that the issue in Bow-
ers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the
claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married cou-
ple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
72. See id. at 723.
73. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Statutes prohibit distribution of contraceptives,
abortion or interracial marriage; they do not make the decision whether to beget a child or to marry
illegal or ban privacy or personal autonomy.
74. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion); Palko,
302 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added)).
75. Id. at 721.
76. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. Later in the opinion, Justice Kennedy quoted at length the
broad description of liberty contained in the Court's opinion in Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992):
These matters [decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing and education], involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are cen-
tral to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of per-
sonhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
78. Id. at 566-67.
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intercourse., 79 Justice Kennedy instead focused on whether the govern-
ment could interfere with personal relationships between consenting
adults.80 In answering that question, Justice Kennedy derided the Bow-
ers Court's exclusive reliance on history. 81 He opined, "[h]istory and
tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry,, 8 2 and found the laws and practices of
the past half-century of the most relevance. 83 Moreover, he defined re-
cent history broadly as showing "an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."
84
Although Lawrence's broad definitions of the liberty interests in-
volved and its limitations on the use of tradition seemingly are a resound-
ing rejection of the conservative trilogy of Bowers, Michael H., and
Glucksberg, the case has not been so read by lower courts.85 Many
lower courts 86 refuse to view Lawrence as a fundamental rights case at
79. Id. at 567.
80. Id. at 567, 571.
81. Id. at 571-72.
82. Id. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
83. Id. at 571-72.
84. Id. at 572 (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
85. See Abigail Alliance For Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445
F.3d 470, 477 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing cases); see also infra note 86.
86. See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817-18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 126 S.Ct. 575
(2005); Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (1 th Cir. 2004); Lofion v. Sec'y of the
Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815-16 (1 1th Cir 2004), cert. denied 543 U.S.
1081(2005); Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 517-19 (2005); Hernandez v. Robles, 2006
WL 1835429 (N.Y. 2006) (Graffeo, J., concurring); Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370 (Va.
2005); State v. Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d 872, 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); see also Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). These courts appear to give a very cramped inter-
pretation of Lawrence. In addition to the broad language quoted in the text, the opinion states the
issue as "whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise
of their liberty under the Due Process Clause .... Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. To answer that
question, the Court reviews many of its earlier fundamental rights cases, id. at 564-66 (discussing
Griswold, Eisenstadt and Roe), not cases decided under a rational basis standard. Additionally, the
Court quotes the Bowers Court's statement of the issue as "whether the Federal Constitution confers
a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy ...... Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
The Lawrence Court found that statement failed "to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake" and
overruled the Bowers decision. Id. at 567. In overruling Bowers, the Court focused on the Bowers'
historical review, id. at 567-73, and referred to the subsequent broad language of the Court in Casey
as casting doubt on Bowers. Id. at 573-74. That analysis implies that the Bowers Court erred by
failing to find a right entitled to heightened scrutiny, rather than by overvaluing the justification
offered by the State. That implication is reinforced by the Court's endorsement of Justice Stevens'
dissent in Bowers. Id. at 577-78. In Stevens' view, the Court's fundamental rights case law pre-
cluded criminalization of sodomy as to all citizens. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216-18 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). The Lawrence Court's conclusion that there was "no legitimate state interest which [could]
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, is
not necessarily inconsistent with heightened review. First, the Court might have meant that because
there was no legitimate justification, there was no need to inquire if the State's justification was
compelling or outweighed the appellants' liberty interest. Second, the Court might have meant that
although society's interest in morality is legitimate, there is no sufficient interest to justify intrusion
into the personal and private life of the individual, an interest subject to heightened protection. See
Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1140, 1157 (2004). Finally, the phrase
could have been used in the same sense in which Justice Stevens used it in his Bowers dissent, an
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all because the Court does not speak of creating a fundamental right and
is viewed as applying a rational basis test based upon its conclusion that,
"[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify
its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual."87 Be-
cause the conservative approach appears to remain dominant, the next
section will highlight its shortcomings.
B. Problems with "History and Tradition" as the Basis for Defining
Fundamental Rights
The primary advantage of the "history and tradition" test is its
greater objectivity, binding judicial discretion so that the courts do not
interfere with the democratic process. 88  Actual application of the test,
however, has proven that the greater objectivity is more theoretical than
real. First, the definition of the right being asserted will often determine
the outcome. For example, is there a tradition of government non-
interference with private intimate relations between consenting adults or
a tradition supporting sodomy? 89 Second, even where there is agreement
concerning the right involved, historical research often will be dis-
puted.90 There can be disagreement about the relevant time as well as
the relevant sources. 9' Lastly, traditions are often conflicting. For ex-
ample, there is a tradition outlawing adultery or sodomy, but there is also
analysis the Court specifically found should be controlling. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. In Bowers,
after finding that prior cases precluded application of the sodomy statute to the public generally,
Justice Stevens analyzed whether the State could justify selective enforcement of the law. Bowers,
478 U.S. at 218-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Steven found no "legitimate interest" for doing
so. Id.
This author speculates that the Court intended heightened review, but was afraid to say so
explicitly. The Supreme Court has stated that classifications that burden fundamental rights are
subject to heightened review. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). By protecting homosexual conduct, the Court may have feared
they effectively would have made homosexuals a protected class. The Court clearly was not pre-
pared to address the consequences of such a holding, going out of its way to clarify that its decision
did not address the constitutionality of state laws prohibiting gay marriages. See, e.g., Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 567, 578; id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added).
88. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 2081, 2105-06 (2005);
Crump, supra note 4, at 863.
89. Compare Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) with Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, rehearing denied
478 U.S. 1039 (1986), overruled in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Justice Scalia's lowest
level of specificity test is designed to overcome this shortcoming. However, Justice Scalia's test is
itself malleable. Results vary depending on how factually detailed one makes the statement of the
issue and which facts are excluded when moving to the next level of abstraction. See Laurence H.
Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057,
1092-93 (1990). More fundamentally, the lowest level of specificity test is inconsistent with Su-
preme Court precedent. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(abortion).
90. See Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L. J. 177, 202-03 (1993); Tribe
& Dorf, supra note 89, at 1087-89; ELY, supra note 3, at 60, 103.
91. See Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One's Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy After
Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 11 (2004). This is particularly true when issues
involve medical and technological advances unanticipated by earlier generations. Id. at 12; see also
Crump, supra note 4, at 862-63.
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a tradition of non-enforcement of such laws; there is a tradition respect-
ing equality, but also a tradition of subjecting various groups to a variety
of forms of ostracism or prejudice.92 Not surprisingly, Justices often will
resolve these conflicts based on what best furthers their own predilec-
tions.93
The fundamental problem with the "history and tradition" test,
however, is not its failure to achieve increased objectivity, but its incon-
sistency with the structure of the Constitution. As Professor Ely ob-
served, tradition's "overtly backward-looking character highlights its
undemocratic nature: it is hard to square with the theory of our govern-
ment the proposition that yesterday's majority ...should control to-
day's., 94 This is especially true when yesterday's majority was com-
posed primarily, if not solely, of white, wealthy, straight men. 95 More-
over, if the only rights receiving protection were those historically and
currently valued by society, there would be no need for the fundamental
rights doctrine, 96 at least other than to provide protection from the mav-
erick state. This would ignore the Court's Constitutional role as a pro-
tector of minority interests, and is inconsistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment's anti-majoritarian purposes. 
97
This article does not suggest that tradition, if one can be agreed
upon, is irrelevant. Tradition, representing the combined wisdom of
generations, often will have much to recommend it.98 Moreover, if the
Court breaks too radically from ongoing traditions, it risks institutional
credibility. 99 What is objectionable is the blind adherence to tradition.
Although some traditions are worthy, others reflect ignorance, prejudice,
or inequalities in power.'00 One should learn from history, not mechani-
cally follow it. It is for this reason that this article recommends adoption
of a right to privacy defined more specifically and considers tradition
only as part of its sliding scale review, and then only if the circumstances
upon which the tradition was based have not changed.' 0'
92. See Brown, supra note 90 at 203; ELY, supra note 3, at 61.
93. See Wolf, supra note 11, at 126-128; Brown, supra note 90, at 210-11.
94. ELY, supra note 3, at 62. Professor Ely further argues that if the Framers wanted to freeze
tradition, they would have wrote out the tradition rather than seek to protect it through open-ended
language. Id.
95. Wolf, supra note 93, at 126-27.
96. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wolf, supra note 11, at 115.
97. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton); ELY, supra note 3, at 62; Niles, supra note 14, at 118; Crump, supra note 4, at 861.
98. See Sunstein, supra note 88, at 2106.
99. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
100. See Sunstein, supra note 88, at 2106; Niles, supra note 14, at 141. The fact that the gov-
ernment has a longstanding tradition of violating individual rights does not make it legitimate. See
id., Tribe & Dorf, supra note 89, at 1088.
101. See infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
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C. The Appropriate Standard of Review
Once a fundamental right is found, the Court repeatedly has stated
that the government cannot infringe upon that right unless the infringe-
ment is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 102 In the
absence of a fundamental right, the government can justify its action by
demonstrating a mere rational basis for its conduct.' 0 3 Because "the re-
view standard for ordinary liberties is so deferential, and the standard for
preferred liberties so rigid," 104 outcomes often are ordained by the desig-
nation of rights as fundamental or not. 
105
Despite the clarity of the Court's doctrine, there is much in the
Court's language and practice that suggests balancing of interests is ap-
propriate. Indeed, Justice Harlan's influential opinion in Poe10 6 seem-
ingly required a balancing of interests. He opined, "'liberty' is not a
series of isolated points," but a "rational continuum."' 1 7 It includes not
only freedom from arbitrary restraints, but also "recognizes, what a rea-
sonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require par-
ticularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment."' 0 8 Justice Harlan further argued that due process, through
the course of the Court's decisions, "represent[s] the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual,
has struck between that liberty and the demands of an organized soci-
ety."'109
One technique the Court has employed to balance interests is to im-
pose a "substantial" or "undue" burden threshold for determining
whether a fundamental right has been infringed. The paradigm example
is Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennslvania v. Casey. 110 In Casey, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed
the fundamental right to choose an abortion."' However, she opined
that,
102. See supra note 6.
103. See supra note 7.
104. Ira Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981,
1030 (1979).
105. Id. at 1029-30; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 417 (1997). The two-tiered approach appears to be particularly popular among the conser-
vative justices. That approach avoids the always-feared subjective decision-making required by a
balancing of interests. It also discourages a court, realizing that the compelling interest test makes
most government regulation improper, from finding a right fundamental in the first instance.
106. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
107. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
108. Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (plurality
opinion); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973).
109. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 765; Casey, 505 U.S. at 850;
Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 (plurality opinion).
110. 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767 n.8 (Souter, J., concurring);
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978).
Il1. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
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[t]he fact that a law which serves a valid purpose... has the inciden-
tal effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an
abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where the state regu-
lation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this
decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause." 
2
The Court necessarily also balances interests when applying an in-
termediate standard of review. In Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, 1 13 although invalidating a restriction on the distribution of contra-
ceptives to persons under sixteen, the Court explicitly indicated that a
lower level of scrutiny was appropriate when minors claimed an in-
fringement of their right to privacy. 114 The Court also has found inter-
mediate review appropriate in cases deciding when the government may
involuntarily administer anti-psychotic drugs to a mentally ill patient."
5
In such cases, the court must find (1) the government interest important;
(2) "involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant
state interests"; (3) "involuntary medication is necessary to further those
interests"; and (4) "administration of the drugs is medically appropri-
ate.""16 Similarly, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,1 7 the Court, in-
validating a local regulation limiting who could live together, stated,
"[w]hen the government intrudes on choices concerning family living
arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served
by the challenged regulation."''
8
The Court even has explicitly balanced interests. In Youngberg v.
Romeo, 119 the Court found that an involuntarily committed mental pa-
tient had a liberty interest in minimally adequate training. 120 The Court
defined adequacy "as that training which is reasonable in light of identi-
fiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case. 1 t21 Youngberg
was cited in Cruzan.'22 The Court in that case stated, "determining that a
person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due Process Clause does not end
the inquiry, 'whether respondent's constitutional rights have been vio-
112. Id. at 874 (citations omitted). Applying this standard, Justice O'Connor found that al-
though the spousal notification provision was invalid, the 24-hour waiting period, informed consent
and reporting and record-keeping requirements were not. Id. at 881-91.
113. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
114. Id. at 693 n. 15 (The Court reasoned that lesser scrutiny was appropriate because the right
of privacy implicated "'the interest in independence in making certain kinds of decisions', and the
law has generally regarded minors as having a lesser capability of making important decisions."
(quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977))).
115. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003).
116. Id.
117. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
118. Id. at 499 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
119. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
120. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 318-19.
121. Id. at 319 n.25.
122. 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
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lated must be determined by balancing [the] liberty interests against the
relevant state interests." 1
23
Perhaps it was not coincidence that in the two most recent Supreme
Court substantive due process decisions, Lawrence 24 and Troxel v.
Granville, 25 the Court didn't even state what standard of review it was
applying. 126 The Court finally may have begun to recognize the limits of
tiered analysis and acknowledge its frequent practice of balancing inter-
ests. Nonetheless, lower courts have consistently cited to traditional doc-
trine. 127  They require the government to demonstrate that an infringe-
ment of a fundamental right is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest. 128  It is for this reason that tiered analysis is cri-
tiqued below.
D. Problems with the Tiered Review
The primary problem with tiered review is its inflexibility. 129  As
Justice Harlan recognized, liberty is a "rational continuum." 130  It makes
little sense to assume that unless a regulation must be narrowly tailored
to a compelling government interest it is valid except if irrational, no
matter how overbroad or how much it infringes an individual's liberty.
The problem is particularly acute when tiered review is combined with
the Court's narrow definition of fundamental rights.131  For example,
consider a law that makes it illegal for overweight people to eat pies,
cake, ice cream, bread, potatoes, or pasta. The Court would have a diffi-
cult time identifying a right to be overweight or to eat those foods as
fundamental under its current jurisprudence and the government has a
rational basis for the regulation-to reduce the health risks attendant to
123. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
124. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
125. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
126. See Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792,2807-08 (2005).
127. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir.
2004); Littlefield v. Fomey Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 288 (5th Cir. 2001); Hodgkins v. Peter-
son, No. 1:04-CV-569-JDT-TAB, 2004 WL 1854194, at *7-*8 (S.D. Ind. Jul. 23, 2004); Loomis v.
United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 517 (2005); State v. Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d 872, 878-79 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2005); State v. J.P., 907 So.2d 1101, 1109-1110 (Fla. 2004); State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333,
341 (N.J. 1977). But cf Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 519 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (recog-
nizing that "it is well established that when a fundamental constitutional right is at stake, courts are
to employ the exacting strict scrutiny test," but questioning if Troxel v. Granville means courts are to
apply some other standard of heightened scrutiny to claims alleging violation of the fundamental
right to familial relations).
128. See supra note 127.
129. Cf Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter stated that it is
better to decide by "candid and informed weighing of the competing interests ... than by announc-
ing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be solved").
130. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
131. Of course, the Court has tried to narrowly define rights, in part, because under the two-
tiered approach, government regulation has little chance of surviving when the Court finds a right to
be fundamental. See supra note 102-04 and accompanying text.
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excess weight.' 32 Yet, the statute seems to be drastically overbroad and
infringe significant liberty interests. 133 Perhaps, recognition of the diffi-
culties created by tiered review's inflexibility explains the Supreme
Court's sometime disingenuous application of its enunciated standard. 1
34
Nonetheless, it is better to candidly acknowledge the weighing of com-
peting interests. Only then can we "actually increase the possibility of
accountability and ultimately hope to reduce the power of idiosyncratic
decisionmaking."'
135
The fact that the Court's application of tiered review often is disin-
genuous is reason enough to reject it. However, the Court's repeated
refusal to acknowledge the realities of balancing and overrule tiered re-
view also has created practical problems in the lower courts. First, fear
that a valid government interest might not survive the tightest fit of strict
scrutiny makes courts disinclined to find a liberty interest in the first in-
stance. 136 Indeed, this fear, combined with Supreme Court warnings
about its reluctance to create new fundamental rights, 137 virtually para-
lyzes courts from recognizing rights by analogy. 138  Consequently, an
individual effectively can challenge a regulation infringing a liberty in-
terest not specifically recognized by the Court only if she is willing to
132. It might be argued that paternalistic concerns should not be considered legitimate even
under rational basis review. However, the government could still justify the regulation as rational by
claiming that the increased risk of the overweight person's suffering sudden heart failure endangers
other drivers.
133. A possible response to this hypothetical is that it is just that-a hypothetical; that we can
trust legislators not to enact such a silly law. One reply is that the framers of the Constitution estab-
lished a tripartite system of government precisely because they didn't trust legislators always to act
wisely. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 476-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Ed. 2003); Wil-
liams, 378 F.3d at 1240 n.l 1. However, the problems suggested by the hypothetical are not limited
to silly laws. Consider a law banning the use of drugs. If the liberty interest at stake is defined by
reference to the statute, as suggested by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Glucksberg, no fundamental right
is involved. 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). The government has an obvious legitimate basis for the
regulation, for example to reduce the incidence of driving while impaired. However, the statute's
application to a bed-ridden terminal cancer patient for whom the drug is the best or only form of
relief from excruciating pain seems to infringe significant liberty interests. Cf Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that application of Controlled Substance Act to users of marijuana for
medical purposes, despite state law allowing such use, did not violate Commerce Clause); see also
Note, Last Resorts and Fundamental Rights: The Substantive Due Process Implications of Prohibi-
tions on Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1985, 1985-87 (2005); infra notes 263-70 and
accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 106-126 and accompanying text.
135. Brown, supra note 90, at 215.
136. See, e.g., Williams, 378 F.3d at 1240 (declining to find a right to sexual privacy by con-
senting adults because such a right would subject activities such as incest, prostitution, and obscenity
to strict scrutiny, something the court was not prepared to do). A possible problem created by this
reluctance to subject a regulation to strict scrutiny is what might be called a tyranny of labels. A
court fearing strict scrutiny in one context might reject an asserted fundamental right that it might
wish to recognize in another. For example, in Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), the Court,
upholding a police regulation on personal grooming, rejected the asserted liberty interest in choice of
one's hair length. One might question whether a law requiring all citizens to shave their heads,
which might be justified as reducing the incidence of head lice (even in the absence of an epidemic,
or even an increase in frequency), should be upheld merely because it is rational.
137. See supra note 50.
138. See, e.g., von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 487 (Griffith, J., dissenting).
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incur the costs of litigation through an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Additionally, lower courts have repeatedly refused to recognize a right to
private consensual sexual relations among adults, a liberty interest seem-
ingly found by the Court in Lawrence, 139 because the Court did not spec-
ify it was applying strict scrutiny.140  If the Court continues its trend of
not identifying the standard of review it is applying, the law in the lower
courts will only be further distorted.
It is time that Supreme Court policy and lower court practice be
harmonized as to both the identification of fundamental rights and the
standard of review to apply to such rights. To do this, there needs to be a
better conceptualization of the area and a more honest statement of the
standard of review actually applied. The proposals in the following sec-
tion seek to do just that.
II. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO PRIVACY RIGHTS UNDER SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS
A. The Conceptualization of Privacy Rights
The conceptualization proposed by this article is heavily influenced
by the writings of John Locke 14 1 and John Stuart Mill. 142 As suggested
earlier, the beginning premise is that the Constitution should be viewed
as a pact between individuals and the government to forgo certain rights
that are necessary to further society's interests, but with a reservation of
rights in certain private areas where the government does not belong.1
43
Broadly speaking, 144 the government, to further society's interests, has a
right to regulate the individual's interaction with the larger world. It
should be presumed, however, that the government does not properly
control the world of the self, defined as one's thoughts, feelings, bodily
integrity, and private intimate relationships
145 with consenting adults. 146
139. See supra note 86; see also Carpenter, supra note 86, at 1155; Paul M. Secunda, Law-
rence 's Quintessential Millian Moment and Its Impact on the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, 50 VILL L. REv. 117 (2005); Herald, supra note 91, at 38 (all finding such a right).
140. See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817-18 (7th Cir.) cert. denied 126 S.Ct. 575
(2005); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815-16 (1 1th Cir.
2004) cert. denied 543 U.S. 1081 (2005); Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 517-19 (2005);
Stanhardt v. Arizona, 77 P.3d 451, 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d 872,
878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
141. See LOCKE, supra note 14.
142. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Legal Classics Library Ed. 1992) (1859).
143. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
144. Precise definition of the areas the government does not belong is not possible without
some recourse to intuition. See Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. Civ. RTs.-CIV.
LIBERTIES L. REv. 233, 236-42 (1977). Yet, as Justice O'Connor observed in Casey, "[Il]iberty must
not be extinguished for want of a line that is clear." Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (plurality opinion).
145. What constitutes an "intimate" relationship cannot be defined precisely. To decide
whether a group is sufficiently personal to warrant protection under the right to intimate association,
the Court considers "'factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from
critical aspects of the relationship."' Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 698 n.26 (2000)
(quoting Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987)).
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In effect, those areas are viewed as controlled by private governments,
that of the individual and the consenting adults. 
47
The Supreme Court on many occasions has endorsed this "right to
be let alone" or "area the government does not belong."'148 As early as
1928, Justice Brandeis stated:
The makers of our Constitution ... recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They con-
ferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
149men.
146. It may seem anomalous to include intimate relations, which are necessarily dependant on
another, as part of the world of the self However, intimacy is necessary for the full development of
the self. Intimacy requires the ability to care and be cared for and "has a great deal to do with the
formation and shaping of an individual's sense of his own identity." Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom
of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 633-36 (1980). The Supreme Court itself has observed
that Constitutional protection for such relationships is warranted and "reflects the realization that
individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others." Roberts v. Jay-
cees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) Casey, 505
U.S. at 851. Almost by definition, private intimate relations exclude the outside world and hence
should exclude the government.
Professor Ely has questioned why food, housing or jobs are not considered fundamental
rights, suggesting that the Court only favors "upper middle class" rights. See ELY, supra note 3, at
59. Certainly, it might be argued that jobs, housing, or food, in some sense, are necessary to the
development of the self. They are at least fundamental to a person's existence. While these interests
are important, the right to privacy should not cover them. The purpose of the Bill of Rights, includ-
ing the Due Process Clause, was to protect the individual from government excesses, see, e.g., Mi-
chael C. Doff, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1187-88
(1996), not to define a minimal level of subsistence to be enforced by the judiciary. Moreover,
privacy is concerned with preventing the government from infringing on the individual's preroga-
tive. The proper decision-maker concerning government benefits, obviously, must be the govern-
ment. See infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text. By contrast, if government regulations
allocated jobs universally or defined what foods must be eaten, the government would need to justify
this infringement of individual prerogative. Of course, the government can .choose to, and to some
extent does, provide for minimum subsistence. However, that is more properly decided by consen-
sus through the legislature, the branch of government that controls the purse, rather than by judicial
fiat. See Doff, supra, at 1235; Crump, supra note 4, at 903.
147. Cf MILL, supra note 142, at 22 ("Over himself, over his body and mind, the individual is
sovereign.").
148. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Casey, 505 U.S. at 847; Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 n.10 (1972); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,.494 (1965).
149. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis J., dissenting), overruled
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). It is
logical to ask if there is textual support for the asserted right to be let alone. The most logical source
is the Ninth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). However, the
Supreme Court has shown little inclination to use that Amendment and the weight of legislative
history suggests the Amendment was designed to protect state, not individual, rights. See Kurt T.
Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX L. REV. 331 (2004); Kurt T.
Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEx. L. REV. 597, 598-600 (2005); Rus-
sell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223, 227-28
(1983). The right to be let alone also can be supported by the overall structure of the Constitution
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There are many reasons to protect this realm of private decision-
making. First, the individual has the most information concerning their
personal preferences. Second, self-definition is an end in itself and is
necessary for complete development and happiness. 50 Third, the free-
dom to develop oneself can lead to genius that benefits society. 5' Con-
versely, the inability to control one's life can lead to unrest and divisive-
ness that undermines societal stability. Fourth, government control of
private decisions risks the tyranny of the majority feared by Madison and
the other Framers. 152 For that matter, the whole concept of deliberative
democracy is meaningless if there is no individuality because the self is
formed by the state. 
53
Although there is no bright line between the "public" and "private"
worlds, analogy may be made to the concept of boundaries in psychol-
ogy. Just as one knows that a mother should not order food for an adult
child in a restaurant, the government should not decide in which private
sexual acts consenting adults can engage. The goal in both situations is
to allow the individual to become fully actualized. Although neither the
mother nor the government can or are under an obligation to make the
individual happy, they should allow the necessary condition for happi-
ness, proper ego boundaries, 154 to develop.
and its concern for individual rights. Although the "right to be let alone" may not be specifically
enumerated, the Constitution is a short document that can't be expected to have specified every right
protected. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 540 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); BARNETT, supra
note 14, at 259; J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699,
704 n.35. Nor does the enumeration of some rights necessarily preclude protection for others. For
example, if someone you know to be a "clean freak" lends you their car and tells you not to have any
food or drink in the car, not to write with pencil, pen or marker while in the car, and not to take any
non-toilet trained babies in the car, you should know that taking your dog in the car and leaving its
poop on the passenger seat is beyond the bounds of your authorization, despite its lack of specifica-
tion. A full discussion of the textual and historical support for fundamental rights is beyond the
scope of this article. It is enough to observe that the Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that
the Constitution does protect certain unenumerated fundamental rights. See supra note 4.
150. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 142, at 102, 106; RuEVEN BAR-LEVAV, THINKING IN THE
SHADOW OF FEELINGS 193, 330 (1988).
151. SeeMILL, supra note 142, at 117-18.
152. See supra note 140.
153. See James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberate Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 23 (1995);
Note, Last Resorts and Fundamental Rights: The Substantive Due Process Implications of Prohibi-
tions on Medical Maryuana, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1985, 1987 (2005).
154. Ego boundaries, as psychoanalytic thinkers define them, are the boundaries conceived to
exist between the self and the outside world. See Matthew Maibaum, A Lewinian Taxonomy of
Psychiatric Disorders, THE INT'L SOC'Y FOR GESTALT THEORY & ITS APPLICATIONS, 2001,
http://gestalttheory.net/archive/maibaum.html; BAR-LEVAV, supra note 150, at 330; CHARLES
BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 59 (rev. ed. Anchor Books 1974)
(1955). It would probably be more accurate to speak of self-boundaries than of ego boundaries, but
the latter phrase is the psychoanalytic term or art. See Maibaum, supra. Strong boundaries are a
prerequisite for a fully developed self and allow the individual to achieve true intimacy and happi-
ness. See BAR-LEVAV, supra note 150, at 150, 158-59, 193, 330-31; JOHN BRADSHAW, BRADSHAW
ON: THE FAMILY 43, 47, 55 (1988).
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B. Non-Private Areas
Admittedly, the phrase "area where the government doesn't belong"
is amorphous and specifying the area as including one's thoughts, feel-
ings, bodily integrity and one's intimate relationships doesn't fully rem-
edy this problem. Perhaps what best clarifies what should be considered
private is a description of what is not private. For the reasons explained
below, the government should be presumed to act where it belongs' 55
when it provides government benefits, regulates commercial activity and
activity in public areas, 56 and seeks to prevent harm to others. 1
57
1. Government Benefits
There can be no privacy right to government benefits, under this ar-
ticle's conceptualization because rights dependent on the government, by
definition, can't be an area the government does not belong. A denial of
benefits also does not interfere with fundamental rights in the same way
as regulation of such rights-individuals can do as they wish and they
are in no worse a position than if the government did not exist. For simi-
lar reasons, there is no obligation on behalf of the government to publicly
fund fundamental rights. 158 Although the government does not have the
obligation to support private choices, it should not be able to deny bene-
fits to which an individual would otherwise be entitled, absent a rational
relation to the purposes of the benefit. 5 9 For example, although the gov-
ernment does not have an obligation to fund abortions, it would be im-
proper for it to deny food stamps to persons who have had an abortion.
155. The presumption may be rebutted when the purpose of the government action is to in-
fringe individual rights. Improper purpose should be presumed if the government lacks a rational
basis for its actions. See State v. Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d 872, 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (discuss-
ing rational basis review for a challenged statute).
156. The government also "belongs" in the area of foreign affairs. This is specifically provided
for in the Constitution and necessarily involves the government. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 3, 10,
11; U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. Apparently, this is so obvious that the Court has never had to
address a fundamental rights challenge in this area. A proper role of the government also includes
resolution of competing fundamental rights. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
324 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1689).
157. Government action in an area it belongs often will affect rights in an area it does not
belong. For example, a law that limits the amount that can be charged for an abortion, a commercial
regulation, can impact the women's right to choose whether to have a child and infringe her right to
bodily integrity. In such cases, this article recommends evaluation of the government action under a
sliding scale analysis. See infra notes 237-54 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-200 (1991); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 317 (1982); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314-17 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469
(1977).
159. To this extent, substantive due process interacts with equal protection. See Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); cf Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (finding that denial of
admission to bar must have rational connection to applicant's fitness or qualifications to practice
law).
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A denial of benefits in such a case is tantamount to a fine and must be
treated as a regulation of the fundamental right. '
60
2. Commercial Activity
There is no privacy right to commercial activity under this article's
proposal. It is difficult to characterize commercial activity as private.'
6
1
It is engaged in with others and does not by itself involve any sense of
intimacy. More importantly, one of the primary reasons for the "more
perfect union" was the need for the government to be able to regulate
commercial transactions. 162  Periods of laissez-faire economics proved
economic regulation necessary to prevent harm to others. Thus, regula-
tion of commerce, specifically provided for in the Constitution, 163 must
be treated as an area in which the government belongs.164 A return to
Lochnerism is not a risk of this article's proposal. 1
65
3. Activity in Public Areas
Tautologically, activity in public areas is not private. As part of the
Lockean pact, the government has the right to regulate the individual's
interaction with the larger world. 166 Public areas represent the commons
and demand regulation by the people rather than the individual. This
would explain why public nudity can be prohibited and why environ-
mental regulations are legitimate. The paradigm non-public area, of
course, is the home. 167 The government's ownership interest also allows
it to make rules on government owned property. For example, the gov-
ernment is not under any obligation to permit abortions to be conducted
in public hospitals. 16
8
160. See infra notes 177-207 and accompanying text for treatment of government regulations
of fundamental rights.
161. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973); Mark C. Niles, Ninth Amend-
ment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis of Personal Autonomy
Rights, 48 UCLA L. REv. 85, 149 (2000); MILL, supra note 142, at 170.
162. See THE FEDERALIST NoS. 11-13 (Alexander Hamilton); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
16 (2005); Niles, supra note 161, at n.120.
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
164. To offset an infringement of privacy rights, however, the government must have a rational
basis to believe the marketplace needs regulation. See Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d at 878. This article
also would require the government's justification to be the actual, rather than a hypothesized, reason
for the regulation. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1307 n.13 (2nd ed.
1988). Where the activity the government seeks to regulate has been ongoing, a court should require
documentation for the need for the regulation. See Hodgkins v. Peterson, No. 1:04-CV-569-JDT-
TAB, 2004 WL 1854194, at *8 (S.D. Ind. July 23, 2004).
165. Lochnerism, named after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905), here refers to the
Court's use of substantive due process to replace a state's reasonableness assessment with its own on
matters of economic policy.
166. See Niles, supra note 161, at Ill & n.14.
167. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
168. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989).
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
4. Harm to Others
The basic role of the government in the Lockean system is to pre-
vent harm to others, both physical and economic. 169 Without the impar-
tial magistrate that is the government, power rather than justice would
determine rights. 170  Mill also recognized that the individual's natural
rights ended where they caused harm to others. 171  This principle is
hardly controversial and the Supreme Court has recognized that it is a
government function to protect non-consenting parties from harm.
172
This is just part of the government's police powers.
However, the concept of harm to others needs to be refined, lest this
exclusion eliminates all fundamental rights. Unless one is a hermit living
in the woods, all actions can cause some harm to others. A person's
choice to discontinue life-support affects all who know him or her.
Knowledge that an individual engages in sodomy may offend or cause
psychological harm to those with conservative sexual preferences. An
important limiting principle was suggested by Hobbes-that one's rights
as against another should be limited by what he would allow other men
against himself. 173 Thus, finding a person's appearance or habits offen-
sive to contemplate should not be considered harm to others because
others would not want their appearance or habits subject to approval of
the individual. 174 Another limiting principle, suggested by Mill, is that
harm to others cannot be solely derivative of the harm to the individ-
ual. 175 This limitation is necessary because any decision one makes can
harm oneself and therefore harm someone who cares about you. A third
limitation is that harm to others generally must result from action, not
omission. 176  This follows from common law principles and protects
against laws such as one requiring donation of body parts to another.
169. See LOCKE, supra note 156, at 276 ("Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the
inconveniences of the State of Nature, which must certainly be Great, where Men may be Judges in
their own Case, since 'tis easily to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his Brother an
Injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it."); BARNETT, supra note 14, at 70-71.
170. See LOCKE, supra note 156, at 271-72.
171. See MILL, supra note 142, at 21-22, 140.
172. The government also has an interest in preventing harm to minors or incompetent persons.
Such persons can be deemed incapable of a valid consent. See Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 57.
173. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 188, 190 (C.B. McPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651).
174. See TRIBE, supra note 164, at 1409. Professor Tribe finds this result completely analo-
gous to recognized First Amendment principles. Id. "The expression of ideas or emotions cannot be
shut off to protect unwilling viewers or hearers without 'a showing that substantial privacy interests
are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner,' since any 'broader view ... would effec-
tively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections."' Id.
(citations omitted).
175. See MILL, supra note 142, at 26.
176. See id. at 24-25.
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C. Standard of Review
This article recommends a multi-factored sliding scale standard of
review in which the balance is presumptively predetermined in two cate-
gories of cases. Specifically, when the government regulates in an area
that it belongs, and there is no significant effect on privacy rights, the
government regulation is presumed valid unless irrational. By contrast,
when the government directly regulates in an area it does not belong, the
regulation is presumed invalid unless it is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling justification. This mirrors current rational basis and compel-
ling interest review. More commonly, however, the government will
regulate in an area in which it belongs, but the regulation will have a
substantial effect on privacy rights. In that case, a court should directly
balance interests using factors described below, giving deference to the
legislative determination.177  This approach resembles that of the Court
under the First Amendment,178 the constitutional provision most closely
analogous to privacy rights. 179 The section below describes the sliding
scale, its relevant factors and presumptive categories, and responds to
criticism of balancing jurisprudence.
1. The Sliding Scale
Common sense dictates that the more central the right and the
greater the infringement, the more compelling should be the government
justification and the tighter the fit should be between the regulation and
the justification. 180 A weak justification or poor fit relative to the pri-
vacy infringement creates an inference that the regulation was improp-
erly motivated or irrational.181  That alone should be sufficient to invali-
date it. 182  To determine the suggested balance and ferret out improper
177. Deference is appropriate to the legislative determination because it represents the results
of the democratic process. Although deference is a vague term, the Court has had much experience
giving it meaning when reviewing lower court decisions. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
178. In the First Amendment context, incidental restrictions on speech that do not have a sig-
nificant effect on free expression are upheld unless irrational. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478
U.S. 697, 702-04 (1986); Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 140 (1969); Dorf, supra
note 146, at 1201. Laws that discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint are subject to strict
scrutiny. See Boos v. Barry 485 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988); Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are In-
fringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 920
(1994). An incidental restriction on speech that targets or disproportionately effects expressive
activity is subject to balancing. See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 710; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968); Dorf, supra note 146, at 1202.
179. The First Amendment protects free expression, in part, because it allows for self-
actualization, much like privacy rights. See C. Edwin Baker, The Scope of First Amendment Free-
dom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 995 (1978); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1966).
180. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 772 n.12 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Niles, supra note 161, at 132-33.
181. See ELY, supra note 3, at 145-47; Niles, supra note 161, at 133 & n.155; Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
182. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion); Dorf, supra note 146, at 1182-83; TRIBE,
supra note 164, at 1312.
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motivation, courts should consider the importance of the right infringed
and the extent of the infringement, the alternatives available to the indi-
vidual, the directness of the infringement, as well as the justification and
fit. Because privacy protection is, in part, designed to protect against the
tyranny of the majority, 83 the court also should consider whether those
affected are underrepresented or if there are other reasons to question the
validity of the democratic process. Finally, to ensure institutional stabil-
ity and avoid the tyranny of the minority, tradition may be considered.
Although the Court does not acknowledge applying a balancing test,
these factors have support in the case law. 184 The application of these
factors will be illustrated in Part III.
a. Importance of the Right Infringed and the Extent of the In-
fringement
This article does not suggest that fine gradations between rights are
possible. However, few would argue that an invasion of bodily integrity
in the form of a restriction on hair length is indistinguishable from a law
requiring all individuals to donate a kidney. The primary determinant for
measuring the importance of the right infringed should be the conse-
quence the regulation has on the life of the individual. 185 This is one
reason the right to choose whether to have a child is so valued. Having a
child alters your way of life dramatically. A child requires years of fi-
nancial and emotional support and reduces the parent's freedom of
movement and activity. 186 Although for most, the rewards of parenthood
far outweigh the burdens, for those where that is not true, parenthood can
negatively reshape their lives. 187 In any event, pregnancy also has ex-
treme consequences for the woman's bodily integrity. Women experi-
ence weight gain, distortion of their bodies, emotional changes, fatigue,
and often sickness.
No matter how important is the right infringed, if the extent of in-
fringement is small, the consequences to the individual are diminished.
Thus, a ban on abortions must be treated much more seriously than a
regulation requiring a 24-hour waiting period before an abortion is per-
formed. The Court explicitly recognized this factor in Casey. 1
88
183. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
184. See infra notes 185-217 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L.
REv. 737, 783-84 (1989).
186. See Karst, supra note 146, at 641 n.90.
187. For some, placing the child up for adoption may reduce the burden of having a child.
However, for many, psychologically or morally, that is not a valid option. Id.
188. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886-87; see also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386; id. at 396 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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b. Alternatives Available to the Individual
Closely related to the effect on the life of the individual are the al-
ternatives available to the individual despite the government regula-
tion.' 89 For this reason a ban on the sale of condoms should not be
treated the same as a ban on the sale of all contraceptives. The latter
makes sexual intercourse a much greater risk and has much greater po-
tential to significantly alter the life of the individual. For similar reasons,
a federal regulation might be treated slightly more harshly than an identi-
cal state regulation. Although the option to move to another state is not
available for many, the option to move to a different country, for most, is
even more theoretical than real. 190 Also relevant to the availability of
alternatives is the penalty imposed. 19' If the consequence of violating
the law is only a small fine, the option of a knowing violation remains an
option. A penalty requiring, or even allowing for, years of imprisonment
effectively removes that option.
c. The Directness of the Infringement
To the individual whose rights are infringed, it may not matter if the
infringement is direct or incidental. Nonetheless, this factor is relevant
to determine whether the government regulation should be treated as the
cause of the infringement as well as whether the government had an im-
proper purpose. 192 If the infringement is too indirect, it may not be con-
sidered the proximate cause of the individual's injury. For example,
environmental regulations may force a business to close, which in turn
may deprive one of the laid-off workers from having the money to fund
an abortion. This should not give rise to a claim for violation of the
worker's privacy rights. It is equally clear that the environmental regula-
tion, with such an indirect affect on privacy rights, could not have been
motivated by a purpose to infringe those rights.
d. Justification and Fit
When considering the government's justification, the Court should
only consider the legislature's actual purpose, not merely some hypothe-
sized purpose. As explained by Professor Tribe:
189. Cf Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (explaining that a relevant factor in determining the reason-
ableness of prison restrictions infringing a constitutional right is "whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates").
190. A local regulation leaves even more geographic options available to the individual than a
federal or state regulation. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 550 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting). Nonetheless, once one goes below the federal level, a competing consideration offsets,
to some extent, the availability of other geographic options. Specifically, the greater the number of
locations that do not have the challenged restriction, the weaker is the local government's argument
that the regulation is needed. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
191. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Chil-
dren & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (1 th Cir. 2004); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1110 (Fla.
2004).
192. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 391 (Burger, J., concurring); Doff, supra note 146, at 1182-83.
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Knowing why government chose to enact a particular requirement,
and why it is being enforced on a given occasion, bears on the way in
which the requirement is likely to be perceived and hence the degree
of affront it is likely to carry; it bears on the extent to which govern-
ment's action is likely to chill protected choices in adjacent areas by
persons who will inevitably understand not only what government
has demanded but the principle on which government appears to have
acted; it illuminates the degree to which invalidation of the require-
ment would serve to educate government itself with respect to the
sorts of designs those in power should resist; and it assists courts in
the inevitably difficult task of deciding how much weight to give to
an alleged concern, recognizing that the history of how an argument
found its way into a case-whether by hindsight or more genuinely-
sheds at least some light on how the doubts regarding the argument's
validity ought to be resolved. 1
93
While a legislature can always reenact the invalidated regulation,
providing a record that the purpose was as the government attorney hy-
pothesized, many legislators would not be willing to engage in such a
charade. In any event, the reason for deference to the legislature is that it
represents the democratic process. 194 If the hypothesized purpose was
not what the legislature intended, there should be no deference.
Given the importance of the rights at stake, the Court should require
the government to provide support for the need for its regulation unless
judicial notice would be proper.' 95 The greater the infringement, the
weaker the justification, and the poorer the fit, the greater should be the
government's burden for evidentiary support. A record would be in-
strumental in determining the government's actual purpose and help
evaluate the weight of the government's interest. For example, if the
government justifies a regulation prohibiting midwives from providing
abortion services based on safety concerns, it would be significant if
midwife abortions led to complications in fifty percent or .0001 percent
of abortions.
Assuming the government has a valid justification, a court must still
consider the fit between the regulation and the government's asserted
purpose. 196 Of course, perfect fit is rarely possible. The degree to which
the fit is imperfect, however, should be used to diminish the weight of
the government's justification. If the regulation is seriously under-
inclusive, it suggests that the asserted purpose either was not the true
purpose or is not especially weighty. If a regulation is significantly over-
193. TRIBE, supra note 164, at 1307 n.13.
194. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002).
195. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 97; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1969); Hodgkins,
2004 WL 1854194, at *8.
196. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 396 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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inclusive,1 97 there are individuals whose rights are infringed for no ap-
parent reason. In that case, the government should be required to pass a
more tailored regulation.
The most common and significant justification that the government
asserts is to prevent harm to minors 98 and non-consenting adults. 99 In
analyzing this justification, a court should consider the severity of the
injury, how speculative it is, and how directly it affects others. In judg-
ing the severity of the injury, physical injury presumptively should be
considered more significant than economic or psychological injury.
Whatever the severity of the injury, it should be downgraded by the like-
lihood that it will not occur.2 °0 When the severity of the injury, down-
graded for its speculativeness, is small, or the injury is too indirect, an
inference is raised that the injury was not the true purpose of the gov-
ernment regulation or, even if the true purpose, is insufficient to out-
weigh a significant infringement of privacy rights. This would be par-
ticularly true to the extent the fit was poor.
e. Likelihood of Defects in the Democratic Process
The principal argument against balancing and judicial scrutiny of
legislative judgments is that it interferes with the democratic process.
20'
Accordingly, when there are potential defects in the democratic process,
greater judicial scrutiny is justified.20 2 The primary factor to consider
here, derived from Caroline Products' famous footnote four, 20 3 is
whether the individuals whose rights are infringed were under-
represented in the legislative process.20 4 It is likely that legislators tend
to undervalue the interests of minority groups to which they do not be-
197. A regulation should not be considered over-inclusive if there is no reasonably satisfactory
alternative to eliminate the over-inclusiveness that still achieves the government purpose. For ex-
ample, consider a drug regulation that prohibits marijuana distribution. Even if the government is
not concerned with distribution to someone who uses marijuana for medical purposes, the regulation
is not necessarily over-inclusive to the extent it covers a distributor to such a person if the exclusion
of such a person would defeat enforcement of the statute. Such might be true if uncertainty as to a
distributor's customers prevented arrest for possession of large amounts of marijuana. Admittedly,
determining the necessity of what might otherwise be considered over-inclusive often will be a
difficult fact question.
198. Minors are presumed to be incapable of informed consent. The government also has an
interest in ensuring that adult consent is informed and real. See Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 57.
199. For Mill, prevention of harm to others is the only justification for infringing an individ-
ual's liberty interests. See MILL, supra note 142, at 24.
200. Cf Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 395 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The invasion of constitutionally
protected liberty and the chance of erroneous prediction are simply too great.").
201. Iddo Porat, The Dual Model of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope of Balancing in
Constitutional Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 1393, 1429 (2006).
202. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
203. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.").
204. See Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
984 (1987).
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long.2 °5 Greater scrutiny also is justified when the interests infringed
may not have been fully considered given the hurly-burly of politics, or
belong to unpopular groups.
20 6
f. Tradition
As suggested earlier, tradition is not a valid test for defining funda-
mental rights.20 7 Nonetheless, it may be useful to consider tradition, to
the extent one can be agreed upon, 08 when balancing individual rights
and government interests. Traditions are likely to be wise as they repre-
sent the considered judgment of many people over an extended period.20 9
Knowledge of historical traditions also can inform judgments about leg-
islative intent. 210 Finally, institutionally, the Court would lose respect if
its judgments regularly were in opposition to public sentiment. 2 1  Tradi-
tion loses its persuasive force, however, to the extent the assumptions
underlying the tradition have changed. For example, if the basis for the
tradition against acknowledging gay marriages is the inability of gay
couples to have children, innovations in artificial reproductive methods
diminish the weight to be given to that tradition.212
2. Presumptive Categories
Presumptive categories are not truly exceptions to the sliding scale
approach. Rather, they are situations where a rebuttable presumption
exists as to the result of the balancing process. Again, the two categories
where rebuttable presumptions exist are where government action in an
area it belongs does not have a significant effect on individual rights, and
where the government directly infringes privacy rights.
a. Government Activity Where It Belongs that Does Not Have
a Significant Effect on Individual Rights
The threshold requirement of a significant effect to trigger height-
ened or full sliding scale review when the government operates in an area
it belongs recognizes that almost any government regulation can indi-
205. Id. at 984 n.243 (explaining that the Court plays a representation-reinforcing role) (citing
ELY, supra note 3, at 88-104).
206. Aleinikoff, supra note 204, at 984.
207. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
208. See Sunstein, supra note 88, at 2106; supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
209. See id.
210. See Brown, supra note 90, at 189.
211. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
212. Often, there may be disagreement about whether the premises behind a tradition have
changed. For example, is there an increased recognition that gay couples may have children from
prior heterosexual marriages or a greater frequency of adoption by gay couples that would under-
mine the assumption that gay marriages do not involve children? The burden of establishing that
postulates upon which a tradition is based are no longer valid should be upon the person seeking to
diminish the significance of the tradition. Conversely, the person relying on tradition should have
the burden of establishing the tradition. In any event, tradition is not intended to be a binding, or
even a critical factor, but merely a variable worth considering.
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rectly or incidentally affect privacy interests. For example, laws against
theft can prevent a poor thief from obtaining the funds necessary for an
abortion. A husband who murders his wife might assert that the homi-
cide laws interfere with his right to choose with whom to have an inti-
mate relation. It would not be efficient to require extended review of
such due process challenges, and in the absence of a significant effect,
the constitutional right to privacy is, at most, only marginally impli-
cated.21 3
The question remains, however, what is a significant effect? No
precise definition is possible and once again, a certain measure of intui-
tion is required. Nonetheless, some general principles suggest them-
selves. The more remote the effect, the fewer the number of people af-
fected, the greater the alternatives available to the individual, the less
likely a regulation should be considered significant.2 14 The Court al-
ready imposes similar threshold requirements in the privacy and First
Amendment areas. 215 Application of the significant effect requirement
should prove no more elusive.
b. Direct Regulation of Privacy Interests
When the government directly regulates in an area it does not be-
long, the regulation should be presumed invalid unless the government
can satisfy the traditional strict scrutiny test. When a law singles out
protected conduct and is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest, "it is a fair inference that the law's principal pur-
pose is the illegitimate one of frustrating the exercise of a right.,
21 6
Again, that alone should be sufficient to invalidate the law.217
3. Criticisms of the Sliding Scale Approach Do Not Recommend
Against Its Adoption
A sliding scale or balancing approach is not without its critics.2"'
They argue that such an approach is too unpredictable, is just an excuse
for justices to legislate their personal preferences, usurps the role of the
legislature, and actually waters down protection of important rights.2 19
213. Of course, the government action still must be rational. See Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 766 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986);
Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
214. To this extent, this category involves balancing. However, the threshold is designed to
allow dismissal of the extreme cases, such as the hypothetical situations posited in the text, without
any significant litigation. In cases of doubt, the assumption should be that there is a significant
effect so that the matter can be decided after a more detailed sliding scale review.
215. See supra notes 110-12, 163.
216. See Dorf, supra note 146, at 1235.
217. See supra note 182.
218. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 204, at 943; Crump, supra note 4, at 906; Porat, supra
note 201, at 1395.
219. See Aleinikoff, supra note 204, at 984-94; Crump, supra note 4, at 906, 910; Michael A.
Scaperlanda, Illusions of Liberty and Equality: An "Alien's " View of Tiered Scrutiny, Ad Hoc Bal-
ancing, Governmental Power, and Judicial Imperialism, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 5, 9, 31-33 (2005).
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These arguments cannot justify courts' continued adherence to tiered
review. A balancing test can be unpredictable and an excuse for justices
to legislate their personal preferences. However, virtually all constitu-
tional interpretation is value-laden. 220 Indeed, the Framers probably rec-
ognized as much, which likely is one reason why the Framers subjected
judges to two layers of approval.22'
Certainly, existing law is not better. One commentator has gone so
far as to describe the Court's current approach as "like the methods of
modem alchemy, conjuring up mystical formulae to conceal the sleight
of hand by which a judge transforms the base metal of personal inclina-
tions into the gold of fundamental rights., 222  The recommended ap-
proach, by providing transparency, should reduce unpredictability as well
as judicial discretion. "By candidly acknowledging and celebrating the
exercise of judgment, we can actually increase the possibility of account-
ability and ultimately hope to reduce the power of idiosyncratic deci-
sionmaking." 223
The more serious criticism of balancing is that it is undemocratic-
by substituting the judgment of nine justices for the representatives of the
people, balancing usurps the role of the legislature. 24 First, this article's
proposal does not call for the Court to substitute its judgment for that of
the legislature. The Court should give deference to legislative findings.
Nor can the Court affirmatively legislate. It can only protect rights from
government infringement. The need for the Court to fulfill its role as the
primary protector of individual rights is particularly acute given the real-
ity that Congress and state legislatures often don't consider the Constitu-
tionality of the laws they pass.225 However, it is not necessary to view
the judiciary as better equipped to protect individual rights than the legis-
lature.22 6 It is obvious that the protection of important rights by two
branches of the government is better than protection by just one. A
multi-branch veto to legislation viewed as infringing rights may stymie
majority preferences and to that extent seem undemocratic. However,
the Framers were concerned with abuses of power and consequently cre-
ated a government with a system of checks and balances. 227  This arti-
220. See ELY, supra note 3, at 67; Tribe & Dorf, supra note 89, at 1060, 1062.
221. See Brown, supra note 90, at 220 n.230.
222. Crump, supra note 4, at 805.
223. Brown, supra note 90, at 215; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law,
in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 184 (1920) ("[Judges] themselves have failed adequately to recognize
their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of
the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very
ground and foundation ofjudgments inarticulate, and often unconscious . .
224. See Aleinikoff, supra note 204, at 984.
225. See Brown, supra note 90, at 186 (citing James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine ofConstitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155-56 (1893)).
226. Cf. ELY, supra note 3, at 67 (although recognizing undemocratic potential of legislature,
questioning whether there is any reason to believe that the judiciary is any better).
227. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 89, at 1064.
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cle's proposal merely asks the judiciary to fulfill its role in that system.
Moreover, given the vagueness of the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment, reliance on precedent may be the best way to achieve pre-
dictability and consistency.228 There is no one better to interpret prece-
dent than the Supreme Court.229
The argument that balancing waters down the protection of the most
important rights is somewhat disingenuous as those least interested in
protecting individual rights are the ones who typically present it.230 In
any event, important rights will be protected if in fact it is agreed that
they are truly important. Indeed, balancing may result in greater protec-
tion of important rights because courts, fearing the restrictiveness of
strict scrutiny, will no longer need to avoid calling important rights fun-
damental.
The fact is that balancing is the way most people resolve issues.
They consider the pros and cons of a course of action and try to decide
which outweighs the other. Balancing "is the mark of a reasonable, ra-
tional, subtle mind.",231 The Supreme Court balances in numerous ar-
eas,232 including in the area of fundamental rights.233 This article only
asks that the balancing process involving privacy rights be done explic-
itly and clearly.
III. APPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED STANDARD
This section applies the suggested proposal to several of the actual
substantive due process issues confronting the courts today.234 Although
I would like to pretend that the proposal provides complete predictability
and is totally value-neutral, that would be nonsense. Judgment is re-
quired for all Constitutional questions and such judgment necessarily is
affected by the decision-makers' values and experiences. What recom-
mends the suggested approach is its transparency. Competing interests
are identified and reasons for their weighting are specified. Litigators
will know how to build an appropriate factual record. Admittedly, unre-
solved questions abound. However, the more the Court resolves these
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1065.
230. See Aleinikoff, supra note 204, at 1004.
231. Id. at 962.
232. See id. at 963-73.
233. See supra notes 106-26 and accompanying text.
234. Without knowing the specific regulation enacted, the purpose of the enactment, or the
factual record presented, it is not possible to resolve all issues that might arise. Alternative bases for
constitutional challenge, such as the Equal Protection Clause, also are beyond the scope of this
paper.
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issues with clarity, the easier it will be to answer the remaining unre-
solved questions.235
A. Abortion
There is little question that regulation of abortion impacts important
fundamental rights-the rights to bodily integrity and to choose one's
intimate relations.236 It is equally clear that the government is acting
where it belongs when it regulates abortions. Bans on abortions, in at
least some contexts, are commercial regulations, designed to prevent
harm to others, and control activity in public places. Accordingly, a bal-
ancing of interests is required under this article's proposal. This section
concludes that a ban on all abortions is unconstitutional. Although
analysis of every type of lesser regulation is beyond the scope of this
article, treatment of such regulations should mirror existing law. After
all, the Court's undue burden standard is itself a balancing test.
237
1. Extent of Infringement
238A complete ban on abortions, as suggested earlier, can have a
huge effect on the life of the individual. Pregnancy plays havoc with a
woman's body and parenthood involves a lifetime of emotional and fi-
nancial commitments. There are few, if any, adequate alternatives for
someone wanting an abortion. Giving birth and placing the child up for
adoption may limit the lifetime effects on the mother, but does nothing to
eradicate the infringement on the woman's bodily integrity. It also car-
ries significant emotional consequences for the mother as well as the
child. Abstinence is obviously unsatisfactory and birth control is not
foolproof or available to some. The penalty for illegal abortions has tra-
ditionally been penal239, making civil disobedience an unsatisfactory
option. A complete ban is a direct regulation of the rights of women, a
group that remains under-represented in the legislative branch. Although
historically abortions may have been prohibited, recent tradition is to the
contrary.240
235. For example, if the Court barred adultery prosecutions in the case of spousal consent, see
infra notes 274-76 and accompanying text, it likely would preclude an action for statutory rape when
there was parental consent, see infra note 280 and accompanying text.
236. Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 739-40.
237. Although the analysis would be similar, as with all balancing tests, one can disagree about
the conclusions. See id. at 878 ("Even when jurists reason from shared premises, some disagreement
is inevitable .... That is to be expected in the application of any legal standard which must accom-
modate life's complexity.").
238. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
239. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regula-
tion and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261,314 (1992).
240. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 846.
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2. Government Justifications
The government might seek to justify a ban on abortions as neces-
sary to prevent harm to others, whether the fetus, the husband or the
mother, to preserve the sanctity of human life, to prevent overreaching
by unscrupulous practitioners of desperate or emotionally distraught
women, or to regulate public morality. None of these justifications for a
ban on abortions should be considered sufficient to offset a ban's signifi-
cant infringement of individual rights.
a. Harm to Others
Harm to the fetus as a justification for a ban on abortions falters be-
cause a fetus is not a person and does not have rights under the Constitu-
tion.24' If it were otherwise, states not only could forbid abortions, but
would be compelled to, at least unless the health of the mother was im-
plicated.242 Similarly, a pregnant woman who consumed alcohol or caf-
feine might be arrested for child abuse. Nor can the government imbue
the fetus with rights at the expense of an existing person's constitutional
rights. As Professor Dworkin explains:
The suggestion that states are free to declare a fetus a person ... as-
sumes that a state can curtail some persons' constitutional rights by
adding new persons to the constitutional population. The constitu-
tional rights of one citizen are of course very much affected by who
or what else also has constitutional rights, because the rights of others
may compete or conflict with his....
... If a state could declare trees to be persons with a constitutional
right to life, it could prohibit publishing newspapers or books in spite
of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech, which could not
be understood as a license to kill. 243
Although a fetus cannot be imbued with rights, it might be argued
that "killing" a fetus harms society by diminishing the value of life. This
argument, however, has more in common with political sound bites than
legal reasoning. 244 The "value of life" is employed selectively. For ex-
ample, those who oppose abortion often support the death penalty.245
The Court itself did not let the "sanctity of human life" stop it from im-
241. Id. at 860.
242. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 398-99 (1992).
243. Id. at 400-01.
244. When vetoing expanded federal support for embryonic stem cell research, President Bush,
a strong proponent of the death penalty and opponent of abortion, said the bill violated his principles
on the sanctity of human life. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, First Bush Veto Maintains Limits on Stem
Cell Research, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2006, at Al.
245. See Arthur L. Rizer 111, Does True Conservatism Equal Anti-Death Penalty?, 6 HOWARD
SCROLL SOC. JUST. L. REV. 88, 115 (2004).
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plicitly recognizing a right to die. 246 Moreover, abortion no more dimin-
ishes the value of life than prohibitions on abortion reduce the value of
having children raised by people who want them. In any event, such
abstract harm cannot outweigh the very real, direct, and substantial in-
fringement of women's privacy rights.247
Abortion can harm the interests of a potential father who desper-
ately wants to become a parent. The problem, however, is that when a
mother and father disagree about whether to have a child, the view of
only one can prevail. As between the two, the balance weighs in favor of
the woman who physically bears the child and who is most affected by
the pregnancy.248
Finally, abortions can harm the women who choose to have them.249
However, if a woman's privacy interests mean anything, it must mean
that a woman has the right to decide whether the potential harms to her
from an abortion are outweighed by her desire to discontinue the preg-
nancy.250
b. Commercial Justifications
The government has an interest in regulating the commercial
arena. 251  If the legislature found that abortion providers were taking
advantage of women seeking abortions, it would be justified to impose
reasonable regulations in the form of licensing, safety requirements, or
even price regulation. If evidence showed that providers, interested in a
quick profit, pressured women to have abortions that they later regretted,
246. See Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
247. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 914-16 (Stevens concurring in part, dissenting in part).
248. See id. at 896 (plurality opinion); Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and
Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1077, 1109 (1998). This is not to suggest that the
government doesn't have any interest in protecting the rights of the father. A regulation that encour-
ages a woman to consult the father that does not threaten the abuses identified by Justice O'Connor
in Casey, 505 U.S. at 888-93, should be permissible. For example, a law might require the abortion
provider, at the time an appointment is made, to suggest consultation with the father or discuss the
impact the abortion decision has on others. Such a law would not significantly infringe the woman's
privacy interests, yet would encourage communication with and the involvement of the father, which
if nothing else, should lead to more stable relationships.
249. See Andrew A. Adams, Aborting Roe: Jane Roe Questions the Viability of Roe v. Wade,
9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 325, 331-32 (2005).
250. Again, while the government interest in protecting the mother isn't sufficient to ban an
abortion, it could justify reasonable regulations to ensure that the woman's consent is informed and
considered. Although this article disagrees with Casey's conclusion that a 24-hour waiting period
does not unduly burden women's right to an abortion (particularly given the district court's findings
of fact, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86 (plurality opinion)), it would view a one-or two-hour waiting
period, with an exception for medical emergencies, as permissible. For many women, the 24-hour
wait would significantly increase the difficulty in obtaining an abortion and, absent more than anec-
dotal evidence, this article would assume that the government's interest could be served almost as
well by the lesser wait. If the government was able to develop a record that showed that a significant
percentage of women regretted having an abortion and would have changed their mind if required to
wait 24 hours, the balance could come out differently. Requiring abortion clinics to develop follow-
up records for this purpose should be permissible.
251. But see supra note 164.
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a ban on commercial abortions might be justified. There is no reason to
believe this currently to be the case. The government certainly has not
developed evidence establishing such a problem. Finally, even if such
evidence were developed, and given the extent of the infringement it
would have to be a strong record, the government could not justify ex-
tending the ban on abortions on that basis to provision of abortion by free
clinics.
c. Justifications Based Upon Public Activity or Effects
A government ban on abortions also might be based upon its police
power to regulate public places and public morality. The obvious limita-
tion of this justification is its inapplicability to abortions performed in
private. As suggested earlier, the offense created by the mere knowledge
252that abortions are being conducted cannot support a ban on abortions.
The government should be able to ban abortions in government owned
buildings, public places, or even places open to public view.253 In such
places, the privacy interests of the individual are diminished and the in-
fringement generally will not be significant given the alternatives avail-
able, i.e., private abortions. Making abortions unavailable in public hos-
pitals may deprive low-income women, particularly in rural areas, of the
abortion option. Nonetheless, the government has the right not to sup-
port abortions under this article's proposal. 4
In short, although numerous regulations affecting the abortion deci-
sion might be possible, a complete ban of abortion would be invalid un-
der this article's proposal.
B. Gay Marriage
The initial question when analyzing a ban on gay marriages is
whether there is an infringement of any protected right. Although under
traditional doctrine, marriage is a fundamental right,255 this article's pro-
252. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
253. For example, the government should be able to require abortion providers to have blinds
on their windows.
254. See supra note 158.
255. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384
(1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Even under traditional doctrine, there is the
question whether the fundamental right to marriage is limited to relationships between members of
the opposite sex. A number of courts have said that it is. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, No. 05239,
2006 WL 1835429 (N.Y. July 6, 2006); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). If so, a ban on
gay marriage need only have a rational basis. This interpretation of the fundamental right to mar-
riage seems to be a strained and result-oriented reading of Court precedent. In no case, recognizing
a fundamental right to marriage, has the court suggested such a limitation. Indeed, the Court has
said, "the right to marry is of fundamental importancefor all individuals." Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384
(emphasis added). The Court has recognized that marriages are "expressions of emotional support
and public commitment" that for many have "spiritual significance, Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96, and
are "one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. These reasons to treat marriage as fundamental
are equally applicable to gay marriages. Furthermore, if marriage was limited to relationships of the
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posal would not consider marriage a protected privacy right. Rather, it is
just a benefit provided by the government. Accordingly, a government
can choose not to support gay marriages, refusing to give it official rec-
256 dognition. What the government cannot do is deprive gays of benefits
because they are not married unless it has a rational basis unrelated to
infringing gays' privacy rights.257 Given the literally hundreds of rights
that follow from marriage, the government would be hard-pressed to
justify each and every one. 58 For example, there doesn't seem a rational
basis for denying gay couples' access to their "significant other" in pub-
lic hospitals that limit visitation to relatives. Similarly, it is hard to jus-
tify depriving gay couples the right of inheritance without a will. The
Court in Hernandez v. Robles,259 attempted to justify these types of dis-
crimination as rationally related to inducement of marriage and its atten-
dant benefits to children. Such a justification is bootstrapping. It is
equivalent to saying that only persons who have not had an abortion are
"bubbas." The benefit of government recognition as a bubba can be ra-
tionally justified as supporting childbirth which is necessary for the con-
tinuation of our society. The government can't then say only bubbas can
receive food stamps and justify it as inducing bubbadom and its attendant
benefits to society.
opposite sex based on the traditional definition of marriage, it could just as well be limited to rela-
tionships of the same race. That position was rejected in Loving.
Of course, under traditional doctrine if there were a fundamental right for gays to marry, a
government ban on such marriages would be subject to strict scrutiny. See supra note 6. Given the
number of childless heterosexual marriages and homosexual marriages with children, the typical
child-based justifications for treating gay marriages differently could not satisfy the narrow tailoring
required by that test. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Hernandez, 2006 WL 1835429 (Kaye, J., dissenting); Goodridge v, Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 961-64 (Mass. 2003) (finding procreation or child-rearing justifications unable to meet
rational basis scrutiny).
Contrary to the suggestions of some, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compul-
sory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 279-80 nn.6,
8, 13-15, recognition of gay marriages would not necessitate acceptance of polygamous marriages.
In the latter case, consent is not easily refused. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569, 578. Without a valid
consent, the government can deny recognition of polygamous marriages because they run the risk of
psychological harm to existing spouses. Lack of consent would also distinguish denial of marriage
to one's pet or favorite flower. See Sunstein, supra note 88, at 2083.
256. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. In any event, the government mightjustify its
support of only heterosexual marriage as rationally related to its interest in supporting stability where
accidental children are possible. See, e.g., Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. 2005).
257. See supra note 159-160 and accompanying text. There is a question whether a ban on
gays' right to marry does infringe their privacy rights. This article believes that denying gays the
right to marry infringes the individual's choice in intimate sexual relationships, a right recognized in
Lawrence. See supra note 86. If one believes Lawrence did not recognize such a right, or that this
right is not significantly infringed, the ban on gay marriage would fall under my first presumptive
category, see supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text, and be valid. One taking that position
might suggest that whether or not the state recognizes gay marriage, the individual is free to have
sexual relationships with whom they wish. This article would reject that argument as an exercise in
semantics. The reality is that depriving gays of the benefits of marriage is punishing them for their
sexual preferences. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 788 (Alaska 2005).
258. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, No. 05239, 2006 WL 1835429, at *2 (N.Y. July 6, 2006)
(counsel identified 316 benefits based upon marriage); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955-57 (Mass.
2003); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 196.
259. No. 05239, 2006 WL 1835429, at *21 (N.Y. July 6, 2006).
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Even if one agrees that the unwillingness to allow gays to marry de-
prives them of many benefits without a rational basis unrelated to in-
fringing gays' privacy rights, there remains the question of remedy. It
may be that the proper remedy simply is to invalidate each of the benefits
dependent on marriage that discriminate against gays. However, if the
purpose of such benefits is to encourage stable, committed relationships,
the proper relief may be to invalidate bans on gay marriage,26 ° or require
the enactment of a civil union provision providing gay couples with iden-
tical privileges as married heterosexuals.26'
C. Medical Marijuana
The government's general regulation of recreational drugs is not
jeopardized by this article's proposal. Such regulations would be valid
under my first presumptive category.262 The government's interest in
preventing harm to others clearly outweighs the indirect and limited in-
fringement on privacy rights and precluding drug enforcement would be
a clear break from tradition.263 The difficult issue is whether the ban
should apply to users of recreational drugs such as marijuana for medical
purposes. Of course, if there were other reasonable alternatives to mari-
juana to deal with the medical concerns, the ban should apply to such
users. The denial of one drug when equivalent ones are available does
not affect the life of the individual one iota more than the ban on mari-
juana use for recreational users. However, what if the only satisfactory
relief from pain is provided by marijuana? This article would put the
burden of establishing the unique medical benefits of marijuana on the
user. Given the findings of the attorney general that marijuana does not
have such unique uses, the burden would be heavy. 264 If the individual
user were able to sustain that burden, this article likely would preclude
the government from prosecuting such an individual for possession or
use of small amounts of the drug.
260. The conclusion suggested in text is not dependent upon finding gays a protected class.
Rather, it follows from a lack of a rational basis for depriving gays of many of the benefits from
marriage other than to punish them for their choice of committed, intimate relationship.
261. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, ch. 23;
Lewis, 908 A.2d at 196.
262. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
263. The life of the recreational user will not be dramatically altered by a ban on recreational
drugs, particularly given the availability of prescription drugs and alcohol. On the other hand, the
government has an interest in preventing the secondary effects from marijuana use such as theft,
assault, driving under the influence and accidental injuries. These effects are concerns even if the
individual is using drugs in the privacy of her own home.
264. This article does not address the appropriate forum for an individual user's challenge. It
may be that the individual should first challenge the attorney general's findings in an administrative
forum. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005); County of Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F.
Supp. 2d 1192, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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Assuming marijuana uniquely relieved pain, a ban on its use would
significantly affect the individual's interest in bodily integrity. 265 Given
that the government is acting in an area it belongs (commercial regula-
tion, preventing harm to others), a sliding scale analysis is appropriate.
By assumption, the extent of the infringement would be great and there
would be no satisfactory alternatives available to the individual. Al-
though the infringement would be indirect, 266 the government's interest
would not be especially strong. Many of the alleged harms from mari-
juana use are indirect, speculative, or unlikely to occur. For example, it
is not clear what effect marijuana use has on crime and most marijuana
users do not get into car accidents.267 One also might question how
strong the government's interest is when it does not regulate alcohol, a
substance with very similar effects to marijuana. This is not to suggest
that the government has no interest in marijuana enforcement. 268 Rather,
that it is not sufficiently strong to outweigh the medical marijuana users'
significant privacy interest in controlling their pain. 269 The government
might argue that an exemption for medical marijuana would undermine
the government's general drug enforcement efforts. Nonetheless, even if
this interest was sufficient to outweigh the individual's privacy interest,
given the experience with medical marijuana exemptions in other coun-
265. Although the Court has never held that relief from pain implicated an individual's privacy
rights, five justices in Glucksberg, suggested there was a fundamental right to use physician-
recommended medication to alleviate pain and suffering to control the circumstances of their death.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by
Ginsberg, J.); id. at 743, 745 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 790
(Breyer, J., concurring). In Regina v. Parker, 49 O.R.3d 481 (Ont. C.A. 2000), the Canadian court
explicitly found that a ban on the use of medical marijuana infringed the individual's right to bodily
integrity.
266. Normally, the indirectness of the infringement would suggest that the government had a
proper purpose. This is certainly true with respect to the Narcotics Act generally. One wonders,
however, whether the inclusion of marijuana as a schedule one drug (a drug subject to abuse, devoid
of legitimate medical uses, and lacking accepted safety under medical supervision 21 U.S.C. 812) in
1970 wasn't, at least in part, motivated by animus toward the "hippie" generation.
267. See Marcia Tiersky, Medical Mari'uana: Putting the Power Where it Belongs, 93 Nw.
U.L. REV. 547, 574 (1999).
268. Even the Canadian Justice who found the use of medical marijuana protected under the
Canadian Constitution found that the government did have a valid interest in marijuana enforcement
generally. See Regina v. Clay, 49 O.R.3d 577, 592 (C.A. Ont. 2000). Obviously, the more danger-
ous the drug, the stronger the government's interest. Thus, an exemption for marijuana use does not
mandate an exemption for cocaine or heroine use.
269. The remaining sliding scale factors are not especially helpful. The users of medical mari-
juana may be under-represented in the legislature, but legislators likely would view their interests
sympathetically. Although there is at least a recent tradition of regulating marijuana, that tradition
would have little weight given that the premise on which the tradition was based, the lack of a
unique medical use, has changed by assumption. Moreover, an increasing number of states have
recognized the medical benefits of marijuana, see Note, Last Resorts and Fundamental Rights: The
Substantive Due Process Implications of Prohibitions on Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1985, 2005 n.107 (2005) and the U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) which requires
marijuana to be listed as a controlled substance, exempts use for medical purposes. See Clay, 49
O.R.3d 577, 590 (C.A. Ont. 2000). If anything, the experience in other countries raises questions
about the government's need for regulation.
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tries, 270 the burden should be on the government to demonstrate the va-
lidity of this concern.
D. Criminal Sexual Conduct
This article's proposal will not have a significant practical effect on
prosecution of criminal sexual conduct cases. The two primary types of
statutes that might be invalidated, fornication and adultery statutes, are
currently rarely enforced.27' Cases involving rape, prostitution, and in-
cest would proceed largely unchanged.
1. Fornication
A fornication statute could not properly be enforced under this arti-
272cle's proposal as to consenting adults having sex in private. Such a
statute directly infringes on the individual's privacy rights. Because the
government would be acting in an area it did not belong, it would need to
demonstrate a justification that was narrowly tailored to achieve a com-
pelling government interest. The government could not credibly claim
any such compelling interest given such statutes' history of non-
enforcement. 273
The government could regulate public exhibition of sexual acts.
That is an area the government belongs and does not significantly in-
fringe any privacy rights. Such regulation would be presumptively valid.
The government also could deny certain benefits to persons having pri-
vate sexual relations with a consenting adult. For example, a public uni-
versity could preclude professors from fornicating with students. There
are rational reasons unrelated to infringing the professors' privacy rights
for such a denial, including fear of sexual harassment suits or perceived
270. See supra note 269. For a description of the Canadian system for exemption of medical
marijuana, see Marijuana Medical Access Regulations, SOR/2001-227, discussed in R. Wood,
[2006] N.B.J. No. 254, 1, 7-8 (N.B.C. June 20, 2006).
271. See Karst, supra note 146, at 670, 674. The non-enforcement of criminal statutes does not
moot the question of its constitutionality. The constitutionality of criminal statutes also can affect
civil liability. For example, in Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35 (Va. 2005), the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant engaged in sexual relations with her knowing that he was infected with the herpes virus
and that he was contagious, and failed to inform her of those facts. If the fornication statute was
constitutional, the plaintiff would have been guilty of criminal conduct and, under a Virginia law
analogous to the "unclean hands" doctrine, her tort action would have been barred. Martin, 269 Va.
at 38. The Court found the statute unconstitutional, reversed the lower court decision, and allowed
the plaintiff's tort case to proceed. Id. at 38, 42-43.
272. If it is true that Lawrence recognized a right to private consensual sex between consenting
adults, as this article has argued, see supra note 86, fornication statutes would be invalid under
existing law also. Even if Lawrence didn't recognize such a right, it could be argued that the right to
beget a child, a right the Court has recognized, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565
(2003); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 & n.10 (1972), necessarily includes the right to do
what is a prerequisite for that right. See State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 339-40 (N.J. 1977).
273. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The government has a
strong interest in ensuring that the sexual relations are truly consensual. However, the rape statutes
fully protect that interest.
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bias by other students.274 The school also could want an announced pol-
icy so that students wouldn't erroneously confuse faculty concern for
sexual advances.
2. Adultery
Adultery statutes directly interfere with private sexual relations be-
tween consenting adults. The government, however, could assert that it
is seeking to prevent harm to the spouse and children of the adulterer. A
sliding scale analysis would then be appropriate. To the extent the adul-
terer is deprived of sexual relations with someone she cares deeply for, it
is a significant infringement. The infringement is direct. The harm as-
serted by the government is speculative, indirect, and does not involve
physical injury. There also would be an issue with fit. If the adulterer
has no children and the spouse has not complained or consented, there
does not appear to be reason for the statute. On the other hand, divorce is
an alternative that would avoid application of the statute, there is a tradi-
tion against adultery, and, unfortunately, adulterers probably are not un-
der-represented in the legislature. What might be the deciding factor is
the history of non-enforcement of adultery statutes.275 As with fornica-
tion statutes, that seriously undermines the government's assertion of
need.276
3. Rape
Under this article's proposal a basic rape statute would be valid. A
rape statute does not interfere with any privacy right 277 and the govern-
ment has a strong interest in preventing harm to the non-consenting
party. Less clear is the proposal's effect on statutory rape provisions.
By definition, statutory rape does not involve consenting adults, and the
government has an interest in protecting minors from harm. Nonethe-
less, the Court has recognized that minors also have constitutional rights,
including the right to privacy.278 A statutory rape statute does burden the
minor's right to intimate relations. Although, the minor may be deemed
incapable of a valid consent, by analogy to the abortion cases, 279 a statu-
tory rape statute, to be constitutional, might need to have an exemption
274. In the case of a teacher-student relationship, there also would be a question if consent
could be easily refused. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 756-57.
275. See supra note 271.
276. The government might alternatively justify prohibitions on adultery as a rational condition
on the benefit of marriage. However, it is unclear that such a condition is ever specified, and if it
was, why the remedy should be criminal prosecution rather than the elimination of the benefit of
marriage, i.e., divorce.
277. Rape, by definition, does not involve private consensual conduct.
278. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977).
279. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 631-32 (1979); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417 (1990). Admittedly, the abortion cases are not a perfect analogy. Statutory rape statutes do not
impose the same infringement on the individual as a ban on abortion. Rather than significantly
interfering with the mother's bodily integrity and imposing lifetime consequences, a statutory rape
statute only requires lesser forms of sexual gratification for a finite period of time.
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for when there is parental or judicial consent. 280  The need for such an
exemption would be strongest in cases involving little disparity in the
ages of the sexual partners. In such cases, intimacy is common and no
longer has the same tradition of disapproval.
4. Prostitution
Laws against prostitution should be valid. The government can jus-
tify prostitution laws as commercial regulation necessary to preserve
public morals and prevent harm to others. Ostensibly, prostitution laws
interfere with private intimate relations between consenting adults.
However, there is a question whether sex for a fee can be considered
truly intimate. Even if such laws were analyzed under the sliding scale,
the balance probably would favor the government. The interference with
privacy rights are indirect and of limited significance for most.2 8 l Alter-
natives are available to individuals-sex with willing participants, mas-
turbation, prostitutes in Nevada or foreign countries, and there is a tradi-
tion of laws banning prostitution. The government's concerns with pub-
lic morality, crime, and health risks are real. Although the injuries are
indirect and somewhat speculative, they can be severe. Regulation rather
than prohibition can limit these effects. Nevertheless, the government's
choice for a complete ban probably should be given deference given the
relatively limited infringement of privacy rights and the tradition of
criminalizing prostitution.
5. Incest
Laws prohibiting the paradigmatic cases of incest would be un-
changed by this article's proposal. Minors are not capable of consent
and the government has obvious interests in avoiding the psychological
harm to the minor and the potential physical harms to any offspring pro-
duced by the incestuous relationship.282 A more difficult question is how
to treat incest involving adults. Here there is no question that there is
interference with the individual's right to private intimate relations with
consenting adults. The infringement is direct and for some is significant
because it deprives the individual of intimate relations with one who may
be the love of his or her life. For such a person, there is no substitute and
the infringement lasts a lifetime, not merely until adulthood. Nonethe-
280. Under current law, failure to include a parental approval provision also might violate a
parents' presumptive right to control their child's upbringing. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65-69 (2000).
281. Perhaps a truly repulsive person might argue that prostitution is the only avenue for them
to have sex with another. However, it is unclear how the individual could carry his burden of proof
and doubtful that a court would want to suggest that someone is incapable of attracting a person of
the opposite sex because of their appearance.
282. Obviously, an exemption in the case of parental consent is unnecessary when the parent is
the party guilty of incest. Even if the adult is another relative, a parental consent provision should be
unnecessary. Unlike in the case of statutory rape, conflicts of interests are involved when the ac-
cused is a relative and incest has a long and ongoing tradition of societal disapprobation.
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less, the government has an interest in preventing offspring with in-
creased likelihood of birth defects and decreased intelligence. Although
such harm is speculative, the physical harm may be severe. The gov-
ernment could also argue that the consent is not valid when one of the
incestuous parties is in a position of trust or if consent might otherwise
be difficult to refuse.283 There might be an applied challenge in a case
where children are not possible or there is no blood relationship, 28 and
there is no reason to question the validity of the consent. However,
given the tradition against incest and the deference due to the govern-
ment, the incest statutes should be facially valid.
E. Artificial Reproduction
The government can regulate the commercial aspects of artificial
reproduction with nothing more than a rational basis unrelated to infring-
ing privacy rights. However, a ban on artificial reproduction should be
invalid. For many seeking birth artificially, there is no alternative
method to have a child. Depriving someone of the parent-child relation-
ship is a tremendous infringement of the individual's privacy rights. It is
a direct interference that has lifetime consequences. There also is no
tradition of outlawing artificial reproduction techniques. If it were
shown that there was a much greater chance of abnormalities through
artificial methods of birth or if a population control problem of much
greater dimension than currently exists developed, the government might
be able to justify a ban on artificial reproduction. However, given the
significant infringement of privacy rights, the government would be re-
quired to develop a strong record to that effect.
F. Sale of Sex Toys
Several cases have upheld a ban on the sale of sex toys. 285 These
cases would remain good law under this article's proposal. A state's ban
on the sale of sex toys has a de minimus affect on an individual's privacy
rights. For most, the use or non-use of sex toys does not significantly
283. See supra note 274.
284. For example, some incest statutes cover relatives by adoption. See, e.g., ALA CODE §
13A-13-3 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:78.1 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-302 (2005);
TEx PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.02 (2005). There also is a question whether the possible harms justify
prohibitions of incestuous relationship involving first or second cousins. See Robin L Bennett, et.
al., Genetic Counseling and Screening of Consanguinous Couples and Their Offspring: Recommen-
dations of the National Society of Genetic Counselors, 11 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 97 (2002) (first
cousins are only 1.7-2.8% more likely than unrelated parents to have children with birth defects or
mental retardation); Richard Coniff, Go Ahead, Kiss Your Cousin: Heck, Marry Her If You Want To,
DISCOVER, Aug. 2002, available at http://www.discover.com/issues/aug-02/features/featkiss/ ("first-
cousin marriages entail roughly the same increased risk of abnormality that a woman undertakes
when she gives birth at 41 rather than at 30"); Denise Grady, Few Risks Seen to the Children of I'
Cousins, N.Y.TIMES, April 4, 2002, at Al (stating that medical geneticists have known "for a long
time that there was little or no harm in cousins marrying and having children").
285. See, e.g., Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11 th Cir. 2004); Pleasure-
land Museum, Inc. v. Beutter, 288 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2002).
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affect their life. There are alternatives available to the individual, includ-
ing traditional sex or manual stimulation. Sex toys generally even can be
bought from other states without leaving one's home. The state easily
can justify the sales ban as maintaining public morals and eliminating the
secondary effects of the sale of such devices. 286 However, a statute pro-
hibiting the private use or possession of sex toys should be problem-
atic.287 Obviously, private use cannot be directly justified by public mor-
als or the secondary effect of sales. Nor could a state justify the ban on
use as necessary to prevent sales. Unlike drugs, the sale of sex toys gen-
erally is not done surreptitiously on the streets. Direct enforcement of
the sales ban is relatively easy. Although for most, the effect of the ban
is not significant, for some, sex toys are used therapeutically to alleviate
sexual dysfunction. 28 8  Absent any reasonable justification, this minor
infringement of privacy rights should be sufficient to invalidate a prohi-
bition on use.
CONCLUSION
If consistency has any value, the Court's fundamental rights/right to
privacy jurisprudence is bankrupt. The Court fluctuates between alterna-
tive tests to determine whether a fundamental right exists. The dominant
test in the lower courts, the "tradition test," lacks its promised objectiv-
ity, conflicts with the structure of the Constitution, and is incompatible
with Court precedent. The standard of review for fundamental rights is
even more problematic. The Court's language and practice are inconsis-
tent. Hornbook law states that a law that infringes privacy rights must be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Yet, in
many cases the Court applies an open-ended balancing test. This dichot-
omy between language and practice confuses lower courts and effec-
tively paralyzes them from finding new fundamental rights.
This article has suggested a Lockean conceptualization of the right
to privacy-a pact between individuals and the government to forego
certain rights that are necessary to further society's interests, but with a
reservation of rights in certain private areas where the government does
not belong. The areas the government does not belong include one's
thoughts, feelings, bodily integrity, and private intimate relationships.
By contrast, the government acts in a proper area when it provides gov-
ernment benefits, regulates commercial activity and activity in public
places, and seeks to prevent harm to non-consenting parties. A denial of
government benefits is valid unless it has no rational basis other than to
harm privacy interests. Government regulation infringing privacy inter-
286. Pleasureland Museum, 288 F.3d at 993 n. 1.
287. Cf Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1969) (Prohibition of private possession of
obscene material cannot be justified as "necessary incident to statutory schemes prohibiting distribu-
tion" of obscene material).
288. See Herald, supra note 91, at 23-26.
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ests is judged by a balancing test which considers the importance of the
right infringed, the extent of the infringement, the alternative available to
the individual, the directness of the infringement, the government's justi-
fication and how closely the regulation fits the government's needs, the
likelihood of defects in the democratic process, and tradition. Where the
government regulates in an area it belongs and doesn't significantly in-
fringe privacy rights the balance is presumed to allow the regulation
unless irrational. Where the government infringes rights in an area it
does not belong, the regulation is presumed invalid unless the govern-
ment demonstrates that its regulation is narrowly tailored to further a
compelling government interest. In the majority of cases, where gov-
ernment regulation is in an area it belongs but significantly infringes
privacy rights, detailed balancing is required. Balancing is what people
do; it is what the Court does. 289 It is time for the Court to openly and
honestly acknowledge its practice and provide clear guidance to the
lower courts.
The recommended approach was applied to resolve a number of pri-
vacy issues facing the courts. Admittedly, one can legitimately disagree
with the conclusions reached. Nonetheless, what recommends the sug-
gested methodology is its clarity. Competing interests are identified and
the reasons for their weighting are specified. Litigators will know how
to build an appropriate factual record, and lower courts will have a blue-
print for analysis. Most importantly, a uniform approach would bring
some measure of consistency to an area that for too long has lacked it.
289. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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